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Why GAO Did This Study 
Multiemployer pension plans—created 
by collective bargaining agreements 
including more than one employer—
cover more than 10 million workers 
and retirees, and are insured by the 
PBGC. In recent years, as a result of 
investment market declines, employers 
withdrawing from plans, and 
demographic challenges, many 
multiemployer plans have had large 
funding shortfalls and face an 
uncertain future.  
 
GAO examined (1) actions that 
multiemployer plans in the weakest 
financial condition have taken to 
improve their funding levels; (2) the 
extent to which plans have relied on 
PBGC assistance since 2009, and the 
financial condition of PBGC’s 
multiemployer plan insurance program; 
and (3) options available to address 
PBGC’s impending funding crisis and 
enhance the multiemployer insurance 
program’s future financial stability.  
 
GAO analyzed government and 
industry data and interviewed 
government officials, pension 
experts—including academics, 
actuaries, and attorneys, 
multiemployer plans’ trustees and 
administrators, employers and trade 
associations, unions, advocacy 
organizations, and other relevant 
stakeholders.  
What GAO Recommends 
Congress should consider 
comprehensive and balanced 
structural reforms to reinforce and 
stabilize the multiemployer system. 
PBGC generally agreed with our 
findings and analysis.
What GAO Found 
The most severely distressed multiemployer plans have taken significant steps to 
address their funding problems and, while most plans expected improved 
financial health, some did not. A survey conducted by a large actuarial and 
consulting firm serving multiemployer plans suggests that the large majority of 
the most severely underfunded plans—those designated as being in critical 
status—either have increased or will increase employer contributions or reduce 
participant benefits. In some cases, these measures will have significant effects 
on employers and participants. For example, several plan representatives stated 
that contribution increases had damaged some firms’ competitive position in the 
industry, and, in some cases, threatened the viability of such firms. Similarly, 
reductions in certain benefits—such as early retirement subsidies—may create 
hardships for some older workers, such as those with physically demanding jobs. 
Most of the 107 surveyed plans expected to emerge from critical status, but 
about 25 percent did not and instead seek to delay eventual insolvency. 
 
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s (PBGC) financial assistance to 
multiemployer plans continues to increase, and plan insolvencies threaten 
PBGC’s multiemployer insurance fund’s ability to pay pension guarantees for 
retirees. Since 2009, PBGC’s financial assistance to multiemployer plans has 
increased significantly, primarily due to a growing number of plan insolvencies. 
PBGC estimated that the insurance fund would be exhausted in about 2 to 3 
years if projected insolvencies of either of two large plans occur in the next 10 to 
20 years. More broadly, by 2017, PBGC expects the number of insolvencies to 
more than double, further stressing the insurance fund. PBGC officials said that 
financial assistance to plans that are insolvent or are likely to become insolvent in 
the next 10 years would likely exhaust the insurance fund within the next 10 to 15 
years. If the insurance fund is exhausted, many retirees will see their benefits 
reduced to an extremely small fraction of their original value because only a 
reduced stream of insurance premium payments will be available to pay benefits.    
 
Experts and stakeholders cited two policy options to avoid the insolvencies of 
severely underfunded plans and the PBGC multiemployer insurance fund, as well 
as other options for longer term reform. Experts and stakeholders said that, in 
limited circumstances, trustees should be allowed to reduce accrued benefits for 
plans headed toward insolvency. Also, some experts noted that, in their view, the 
large size of these reductions for some severely underfunded plans may warrant 
federal financial assistance to mitigate the impact on participants. Experts and 
stakeholders also noted tradeoffs, however. For example, reducing accrued 
benefits could impose significant hardships on some retirees, and any possible 
financial assistance must be considered in light of the existing federal debt. 
Options to improve long term financial stability include changes to withdrawal 
liability—payments assessed to an employer upon leaving the plan based on 
their share of unfunded vested benefits—to increase the amount of assets plans 
can recover or to encourage employers to remain in or join the plan. In addition, 
experts and stakeholders said an alternative plan design that permits 
adjustments in benefits tied to key factors, such as the funded status of the plan, 
would provide financial stability and lessen the risk to employers. These and 
other options also have important tradeoffs, however.  
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contact Charles Jeszeck at (202) 512-7215 or 
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United States Government Accountability Office 
Washington, DC 20548 
March 28, 2013 
The Honorable John Kline 
Chairman 
Committee on Education and the Workforce 
House of Representatives 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
Multiemployer plans—defined benefit plans established through 
collectively bargained pension agreements between labor unions and two 
or more employers—are a vital source of retirement income for millions of 
Americans. Multiemployer plans cover unionized workers in many 
industries, such as trucking, retail food, construction, mining, and garment 
making. There are about 1,500 multiemployer plans covering more than 
10 million workers and retirees. The structure of multiemployer plans has 
some advantages compared to single-employer plans. For example, 
workers in multiemployer plans can continue to accrue pension benefits 
when they change employers if their new employer is a contributing 
employer in the same plan. Thus, these plans provide some portability of 
benefits and can be particularly beneficial to workers who change 
employers as long as their new employer participates on the same plan. 
However, the structure of multiemployer plans can also pose challenges 
in some cases. Unlike plans sponsored by a single-employer in which 
plans do not share risk with other employers, a multiemployer plan 
continues to operate if an individual employer leaves or goes out of 
business, leaving the remaining employers to cover any unfunded 
benefits of the vested workers of the departed employers. Many plans are 
in declining industries that have witnessed numerous bankruptcies, 
leaving a considerable share of participants with no contributing 
employer. This effect, combined with an aging workforce and declining 
unionization, leaves many plans facing demographic challenges that 
threaten their long-term financial outlook. 
In 2010, we reported that due to investment market declines and 
demographic challenges, most multiemployer plans had large funding 
shortfalls and faced an uncertain future.1 We noted that some plans would 
                                                                                                                    
1 GAO, Private Pensions: Changes Needed to Better Protect Multiemployer Pension 
Benefits, GAO-11-79 (Washington, D.C.: October 2010). 
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likely be able to improve their funded status with improvements to the 
economy, but plans in the worst condition may have been unable to fully 
address these challenges through increasing employer contributions or 
reducing certain benefits. We found that without additional options to 
address plan underfunding or to attract new contributing employers, plans 
may be more likely to require financial assistance from the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). This would, in turn, further strain 
the multiemployer pension insurance program that PBGC operates.2 More 
recently, a January 2013 report published by three federal agencies noted 
the grave condition of some multiemployer plans and PBGC’s 
multiemployer insurance program.3 This tri-agency report further noted 
that unless timely action is taken to provide additional tools for the 
multiemployer plan trustees to stabilize the financial conditions of their 
plans, more costly and intrusive intervention may ultimately be necessary. 
Given the financial challenges that multiemployer plans continue to face, 
we sought to answer the following questions: 
1) What actions have multiemployer plans in the weakest financial 
condition taken in recent years to improve their long-term financial 
position? 
2) To what extent have plans relied on PBGC assistance since 2009, and 
what is known about the prospective financial condition of the 
multiemployer plan insurance program? 
3) What options are available to address PBGC’s impending funding 
crisis and enhance the program’s future financial stability? 
To answer these questions, we analyzed government and industry data; 
reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and documentation from 
                                                                                                                    
2 PBGC is on GAO’s High Risk List. For more information, see GAO, High-Risk Series: An 
Update, GAO-11-278 (Washington, D.C.: February 2011). 
3U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation, Multiemployer Pension Plans: Report to Congress Required by the Pension 
Protection Act of 2006 (Washington, D.C.; January 2013). Additional substantive 
information on this issue is contained in two PBGC reports also published recently. These 
are PBGC Insurance of Multiemployer Pension Plans: Report to Congress Required by 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation, Washington D.C., January 2013 and FY 2012 PBGC Exposure 
Report, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  
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plans; and interviewed a wide range of industry experts and stakeholders. 
In particular, to identify actions that multiemployer plans in the weakest 
financial condition have taken to improve their long-term financial 
position, we reviewed the survey methodology and analyzed 
multiemployer plan survey data from the Segal Company, a large 
actuarial firm with a client base representing about 25 percent of 
multiemployer plans. To supplement the survey data, we conducted 
structured interviews with 13 multiemployer plans across the country. We 
selected these plans in order to obtain a range of key characteristics, 
including industry, region, funded status, and number of participants. 
Among the 13 plans included in our review, 8 plans were in critical status, 
2 plans were in endangered or seriously endangered status, and 3 plans 
were in neither critical nor endangered status.4 To determine the extent to 
which plans have taken advantage of PBGC financial assistance and to 
assess the financial condition of PBGC’s insurance program, we obtained 
PBGC data on various types of assistance to plans and data regarding 
plans that are insolvent or expected to become so in the next 20 years. 
To identify options available to address PBGC’s impending funding crisis 
and enhance its future financial stability, we distinguished between 
options that would address the more immediate funding crisis facing 
plans headed toward insolvency and options that may enhance the long-
term stability of the multiemployer system for plans that may not be 
headed for insolvency, but, nevertheless, face financial challenges. In 
addition, we assessed the tradeoffs of various options for current workers, 
retirees, and employers, as well as the federal government. To identify 
and assess available options, we interviewed government officials, 
pension experts—including academics, actuaries, attorneys, 
multiemployer plans’ trustees and administrators, employers and trade 
associations, unions, advocacy organizations, and other relevant 
stakeholders. We also reviewed relevant research and documentation, 
including proposals by the National Coordinating Committee on 
                                                                                                                    
4 “Endangered,” “seriously endangered,” and “critical” statuses are designations created 
by the Pension Protection Act of 2006 and are defined later in this report.   
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Multiemployer Plans (NCCMP) and a consortium of employer 
representatives from the construction industry.5 
We conducted this performance audit from March 2012 through March 
2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 
obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
 
Multiemployer defined benefit (DB) pension plans are created by 
collective bargaining agreements between labor unions and two or more 
employers, and generally operate under the joint trusteeship of unions 
and employers. Such plans typically exist in industries with many small 
employers who may be unable to support an individual DB plan, or where 
seasonal or irregular employment results in high labor mobility between 
employers. Industries where multiemployer plans are prevalent include 
trucking, construction, retail, and mining and manufacturing. Like single-
employer DB plans, multiemployer DB plans pay retirees a defined 
benefit after retirement.6 
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as 
amended,7 the benefits of multiemployer plans are insured by PBGC.8 As 
                                                                                                                    
5 NCCMP is an organization representing multiemployer plans and practitioners. In August 
2011, NCCMP convened a commission to review and propose options for addressing 
challenges facing multiemployer plans. NCCMP’s report “Solutions not Bailouts: A 
Comprehensive Plan from Business and Labor to Safeguard Multiemployer Retirement 
Plan Security, Protect Taxpayers and Spur Economic Growth” was released in February 
2013. The commission members include representatives from plans, employers, and 
unions. Participating industries include construction, trucking, retail food, entertainment, 
machinists, mining, bakery and confectionary, and service. We also spoke with a wide 
range of plan representatives, including executive staff and both union and employer 
trustees. 
6 Multiemployer pension plans are commonly associated with parallel multiemployer funds 
providing medical coverage and other welfare-type benefits.  
7 29 U.S.C. § 1001 nt. 
Background 
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shown in table 1, PBGC’s multiemployer fund is financed by insurance 
premiums paid by plans, with each multiemployer plan paying an annual 
premium of $12 per participant to PBGC as of 2013.9 In return, PBGC 
provides financial assistance in the form of loans to plans that become 
insolvent, that is, plans that do not have sufficient assets to pay pension 
benefits at the PBGC guaranteed level for a full plan year. Although such 
financial assistance is referred to as a “loan,” and is by law required to be 
repaid, in practice such loans have almost never been repaid, as plans 
generally do not emerge from insolvency. Before PBGC will provide the 
loans, participants’ retirement benefits must be reduced to a level 
specified in law.10 Even after insolvency, the plan remains an independent 
entity managed by its board of trustees. This contrasts with the agency’s 
single-employer program under which PBGC does not provide assistance 
to ongoing plans, but instead takes over terminated underfunded plans as 
a trustee, and pays benefits directly to participants. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
8 29 U.S.C. § 1322a. The multiemployer insurance program is maintained separately from 
another PBGC fund, which insures the benefits of single-employer pension plans. Among 
other things, the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA), made 
employers liable for their share of unfunded plan benefits when they withdraw from a plan, 
unless relieved by special provisions, and strengthened certain funding requirements. 
Pub. L. No. 96-364, §§ 104(2) and 304, 94 Stat. 1208, 1217 and 1293-94. 
9 The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (Map-21) increased the premium 
by $3 per participant for 2013 and provided that after 2013, the multiemployer plan 
premium will continue to be indexed for increases in the annual rate of growth in the 
national average wage. Pub. L. No. 112-41, § 40222, 126 Stat. 405, 852 (2012).   
10 For participants of plans that became insolvent after December 21, 2000, annual 
benefits paid by plans receiving PBGC loans are the product of a participant’s years of 
service multiplied by 1) 100 percent of the first $11 of the monthly benefit accrual rate, and 
2) 75 percent of the next $33 of the accrual rate. For someone with 30 years of service, 
the guaranteed annual benefit limit is $12,870. In contrast, PBGC’s single-employer 
program guarantees full benefits up to a maximum of $57,477.24 per year at age 65 for 
plans that terminate in 2013.  
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Table 1: Selected Differences between Single-employer and Multiemployer Defined Benefit Pension Plans  
Plan characteristic Single-employer plans Multiemployer plans 
PBGC benefit guarantee 
levels 
PBGC guarantees benefits up to $57,477.24 
per year for a retiree at age 65 in plans that 
terminate in 2013. Guarantee levels are 
indexed for inflation. 
PBGC guarantees benefits up to $12,870 per year, 
based on 30 years of employment. Guarantee levels 
are not indexed for inflation. 
PBGC premium structure In 2013, plans pay PBGC a flat rate of $42 per 
participant that is indexed for inflation. Plans 
are also subject to a variable rate premium 
based on underfunding. Terminating plans are 
also subject to a termination premium.  
In 2013, plans pay PBGC an annual flat rate premium 
of $12 per participant. The premium is indexed for 
inflation. 
Insurable events The insurable event is plan termination, often 
due to the bankruptcy of a plan sponsor with an 
underfunded plan, after which PBGC assumes 
responsibility and pays benefits directly to 
participants. 
The insurable event is plan insolvency. 
Provision of financial 
assistance 
PBGC provides no financial assistance to plans 
but instead takes over terminated underfunded 
plans as trustee. 
 
PBGC provides loans to plans when they become 
insolvent, and a plan need not be terminated to 
qualify for financial assistance. Insolvent plans also 
are required to reduce or suspend payment of any 
portion of benefits to beneficiaries that exceeds 
PBGC’s guarantee level. If a plan recovers from 
insolvency, it must begin repaying the PBGC loan. 
Fiduciary and settlor 
functiona 
Sponsor generally assumes fiduciary role in 
addition to its settlor role. 
Individual employers do not assume a fiduciary role in 
plan management, which is instead handled by a 
board of trustees. 
Risk distribution Plans generally do not share the risk with other 
employers. 
Plans typically continue to operate after an individual 
employer goes out of business because the plan’s 
remaining employers are collectively liable for funding 
benefits for all vested participants. 
Portability of benefitsb Plans are generally maintained by only one 
employer and their benefits are not normally 
portable. 
Plans provide participants some benefit portability 
because they allow workers to continue to accrue 
pension benefits when they change jobs as long as 
their new employer also participates in the same plan. 
Many plans provide reciprocity, allowing portability 
among plans.  
Ability to adjust contribution 
and benefit levels 
Employers, depending on their employees’ 
bargaining rights, may make adjustments to 
future contributions and benefits according to 
the company’s fiscal condition provided that 
minimum funding requirements are met. 
Typically, the collective bargaining parties set the 
contribution rates for the duration of the collective 
bargaining agreements and plans may have to wait 2 
or 3 years before all agreements are renegotiated to 
increase contribution rates. 
Plan terminations PBGC assumes trusteeship and administers 
payment of participant benefits when an 
underfunded plan terminates with a bankrupt 
sponsor. 
 
If an employer withdraws from a plan, the accrued 
benefits for its workers stay in and are administered 
by the plan. The plan terminates by mass withdrawal 
of all contributing employers. When a plan becomes 
insolvent, PBGC does not take over trusteeship but 
instead provides financial assistance to its trustees, 
who continue to administer the plan until all benefits 
are paid out. 
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Plan characteristic Single-employer plans Multiemployer plans 
Employer withdrawal Withdrawal liability does not apply to single-
employer plans sponsors. However, employers 
are liable for benefits earned by their 
employees and to PBGC for any underfunding. 
An employer seeking to withdraw from a plan is liable 
for its allocable share of the plan’s unfunded vested 
benefits for all employees covered by the plan. In 
cases of bankruptcy, the remaining employers in the 
plan assume responsibility for funding benefits to the 
bankrupt employer’s participants. 
Source: GAO analysis of ERISA, PBGC documents, and prior GAO reports. 
aA settlor or settlor function, typically of a plan sponsor or employer, includes functions such as 
establishing a plan and choosing its design and features. A settlor or settlor function typically does not 
include any fiduciary responsibility and therefore can include consideration of a company’s business 
interests. 
bMultiemployer plans provide portability in that they enable participants to change employers under 
the plan without interrupting their benefit coverage. 
Congress included provisions directed at imposing greater financial 
discipline on multiemployer plans in the Pension Protection Act of 2006 
(PPA).11 Specifically, as outlined in table 2, this law includes new 
provisions designed to compel multiemployer plans in poor financial 
shape to take action to improve their financial condition over the long 
term. The law established two categories of troubled plans—endangered 
status (commonly referred to as “yellow zone,” and which includes an 
additional subcategory of “seriously endangered”) and a more seriously 
troubled critical status (commonly referred to as “red zone”). PPA further 
requires plans in these categories to develop strategies that include 
contribution increases, benefit reductions, or both, designed to improve 
their financial condition in coming years. Multiemployer plans in 
endangered status are to document these strategies in a funding 
improvement plan, and multiemployer plans in critical status plans are to 
do so in a rehabilitation plan. The plan trustees can offer the bargaining 
parties multiple schedules from which to choose, but one of these must 
be designated as the “default schedule,” which is to be imposed if the 
bargaining parties do not select one of the schedules within a specified 
timeframe. Once plan trustees have adopted a funding improvement or 
rehabilitation plan, bargaining parties are to select one of the available 
benefit and/or contribution schedules through the collective bargaining 
                                                                                                                    
11 Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780. 
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process. The multiemployer plan is then required to report on progress 
made in implementing its funding improvement or rehabilitation plan.12 
Table 2: PPA Provisions Related to Endangered and Critical Status Plans 
Zone Status Criteriaa Required plans and objectivesb  Additional flexibilities 
Endangered  • Plan is less than 80 percent funded 
or is projected to have a funding 
deficiency within 7 years. 
Funding Improvement Plan 
Designed to close the funding gap by 
one-third over 10 years. 
None 
Seriously 
Endangered 
• Plan is both less than 80 percent 
funded and is projected to have a 
funding deficiency within 7 years. 
Funding Improvement Plan 
Designed to close funding gap by one-
fifth over 15 years.  
None 
Critical  • Plan is less than 65 percent funded 
and projects a funding deficiency 
within 4 years or projects insolvency 
within 6 years; or 
• the plan projects a funding 
deficiency within 3 years; or 
• liabilities for inactive participants are 
greater than for active participants, 
contributions are less than normal 
cost—defined as the annual growth 
in pension liabilities resulting from an 
additional year of service by plan 
participants—and interest on 
unfunded liabilities, and a funding 
deficiency is expected within 4 
years; or 
• the plan projects insolvency within 4 
years. 
Rehabilitation Plan 
Designed to get the fund out of critical 
status within 10 years. 
Plan can also reduce 
“adjustable benefits”—that 
is, certain optional benefit 
payments such as early 
retirement and disability 
benefits for participants 
who have not yet retired; 
reductions in the level of 
accrued benefits payable at 
normal retirement remains 
generally prohibited.c  
Source: GAO analysis of PPA requirements. 
aA plan’s “percent funded” or funded percentage is defined as the percentage of plan assets to the 
plan’s actuarial accrued liability. For this purpose, plan assets are allowed to be measured using a 
“smoothed” value that delays recognition of market fluctuations. A plan has an accumulated funding 
deficiency if, according to calculations specified by ERISA, required minimum contributions have not 
been made to the plan. 
bAs described below, Congress subsequently allowed eligible plans to opt for a 3 year extension, so 
that endangered and critical status plans would have 13 rather than 10 years (and seriously 
endangered plans would have 18 rather than 15 years) to close the funding gap. 
cUnder 29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)(8)(A)(iv)(III), benefit increases that are not eligible for a PBGC guarantee 
under 29 U.S.C. § 1322a (i.e., benefit increases adopted or first effective less than 60 months before 
the first day of the first critical status year) may be reduced even if the participant has started 
receiving his or her benefit. 
                                                                                                                    
12 While endangered or critical plans are in a funding improvement or rehabilitation period, 
they must report annually on whether scheduled progress has been made under the plan 
in their Form 5500 filings. 
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Because of the greater severity of critical status plans’ funding condition, 
such plans have an important exception to ERISA’s anti-cutback rule13 in 
that they may reduce or eliminate certain so-called “adjustable benefits” 
such as early retirement benefits or subsidies, certain post-retirement 
death benefits, and disability benefits for plan participants who have not 
yet retired. For example, if a critical status plan were to adopt a 
rehabilitation plan that proposed to eliminate an early retirement benefit, 
appropriate notice was provided, and the reduction agreed to in collective 
bargaining, then participants not yet retired would no longer be able to 
receive that early retirement benefit.14 
PPA funding requirements took effect in 2008 just as the nation was 
entering a severe economic crisis. The dramatic decline in the value of 
stocks and other financial assets in 2008 and the accompanying 
recession broadly weakened multiemployer plans’ financial health.15 In 
response, Congress enacted the Worker, Retiree, and Employer 
Recovery Act of 2008 (WRERA) which contained provisions designed to 
help pension plans and participants by providing funding relief to help 
them navigate the difficult economic environment.16 For example, 
WRERA relief measures allowed multiemployer plans to temporarily 
freeze their funding status at the prior year’s level, and extend the 
timeframe for plans’ funding improvement or rehabilitation plans from 10 
to 13 years.17 In addition, Congress enacted the Preservation of Access 
to Care for Medicare Beneficiaries and Pension Relief Act of 2010 (PRA), 
which provides additional funding relief measures for multiemployer plans 
as long as a plan meets certain solvency requirements.18 Generally, PRA 
                                                                                                                    
13 Subject to certain exceptions, once an individual’s benefit is vested (or earned), the 
vested benefit cannot be cut back through a plan amendment. 26 U.S.C. § 411(d)(6) and 
29 U.S.C. § 1054(g). 
14 26 U.S.C. § 432(e)(8). Certain specific conditions apply to the ability to “adjust” these 
benefits. 
15 Because employer contributions to multiemployer plans are generally based on hours 
worked, the high unemployment rates that accompany an economic recession also reduce 
plan revenue and negatively affect plan funding levels.   
16 Pub. L. No. 110-458, 122 Stat. 5092.  
17 WRERA relief measures extended seriously endangered plans’ funding improvement 
period from 15 to 18 years. 
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allows a plan to amortize the investment losses from the 2008 market 
collapse over 29 years rather than 15 years, and to recognize such losses 
in the actuarial value of assets over 10 years instead of 5 years, so that 
the negative effects of the market decline on asset values are spread out 
over a longer period.19 
Overall, since 2009, multiemployer plans have experienced 
improvements in funding status, but a sizeable portion of plans are still 
critical or endangered. According to plan-reported data—current through 
2011—from the IRS (see fig. 1), while the funding status of plans has not 
returned to 2008 levels, the percentage of plans in critical status declined 
from 34 percent in 2009 to 24 percent in 2011.20 Similarly, the percentage 
of plans in endangered status also declined, and to a greater extent, from 
34 percent in 2009 to 16 percent in 2011. However, based on the 2011 
data from the IRS, despite these improvements, 40 percent of plans still 
have not emerged from critical or endangered status. 
 
                                                                                                                    
18 Pub. L. No. 111-192, 124 Stat. 1280. To meet PRA’s solvency test, a plan must 
demonstrate that it has sufficient assets to timely pay expected benefits and anticipated 
expenditures over the period of time when PRA relief measures would take effect. 
19 Such “asset smoothing” is an actuarial technique used to focus decision making on the 
long term, and avoid disruptive reactions to short term fluctuations in asset values. Just as 
this technique prevents assets from being fully marked down after a severe market 
decline, it prevents assets from being fully marked up following a rally in asset values, 
though only if the technique is followed consistently.     
20 Although WRERA funding relief measures allowed plans to temporarily freeze their 
funding status at the prior year’s level, actuarial certifications were required to reflect a 
plan’s zone status without regard to the application of WRERA relief. However, PRA 
funding relief was permitted to be reflected in a plan’s actuarial certification, and so PRA 
funding relief had an effect on the zone status of many plans in 2010 and 2011. 
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Figure 1: Number of Multiemployer Plans in Each Funding Zone Status, as Certified with IRS, 2008 through 2011 
 
Note: The total number of plans filing a zone-status certification declined from 2008 to 2011. 
According to IRS, the decline may be attributable to plan mergers or terminations and plans’ failure to 
file a certification. 
 
 
The large majority of the most severely underfunded multiemployer 
plans—those in critical status—have, according to a 2011 survey, both 
increased required employer contributions and reduced participant 
benefits in an effort to improve plans’ financial positions. Plan officials 
explained that these changes have had or are expected to have a range 
of effects, and in some cases may severely affect employers and 
participants. While most critical status plans expect to recover from their 
current funding difficulties, about 25 percent do not and instead seek to 
delay eventual insolvency. 
 
 
 
Severely Underfunded 
Plans Have Cut 
Benefits to Current 
Employees and 
Increased Employer 
Contributions, but 
Financial Outlook for 
Some Plans Remains 
Bleak 
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A 2011 survey of 107 critical status multiemployer plans conducted by the 
Segal Company shows that the large majority developed rehabilitation 
plans that included a combination of both contribution increases and 
benefit reductions to be implemented in the coming years.21 Further, 
plans proposed to take these measures regardless of whether the 
bargaining parties adopt the preferred schedule or the default schedule.22 
As figure 2 illustrates, of the preferred schedules of 107 critical plans 
surveyed, 81 included both contribution increases and benefits cuts, while 
14 proposed contribution increases only, and 7 included benefit 
reductions only. Most default schedules also include both increased 
contributions and reduced benefits, but compared to the preferred 
schedules, a much larger percentage chose to reduce benefits only. The 
reason for this difference is not clear, but Segal Company officials noted 
that because prompt adoption of an acceptable schedule is desirable, 
some plans may take special steps to make the default plan especially 
unappealing.23 
                                                                                                                    
21 Unless otherwise noted, data pertaining to actions that critical status plans have taken 
to emerge from critical status are based on a 2011 survey conducted by the Segal 
Company, a large actuarial firm that provides consulting services to multiemployer plans 
that account for about 25 percent of multiemployer plans and about 30 percent of 
multiemployer plan participants. See appendix I for more details on this data and overall 
methodology. The same data was the basis of a 2011 report, Multiemployer Plans 
Respond to the Financial Crisis, Judith F. Mazo and Eli Greenblum, Pension Research 
Council Working Paper PRC WP2011-15, September 2011.  
22 The survey defined the “preferred schedule” as the schedule of contribution increases 
and benefits reductions that plan trustees intend to be most desirable or which has 
become the dominant schedule through collective bargaining. According to PPA, the 
default schedule is the schedule to be imposed on bargaining parties if they fail to agree 
on the preferred schedule or another provided by plan trustees. 
23 Multiemployer Plans Respond to the Financial Crisis, Pension Research Council.  
Critical Status Plans Have 
Established a Range of 
Contribution Increases and 
Benefit Cuts 
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Figure 2: Number of Plans Proposing Actions in Rehabilitation Plans 
 
Note: Of the 107 plans surveyed, this chart does not reflect 4 plans that determined they would 
emerge from critical status with no action. Also, the preferred schedule bar excludes one plan that 
submitted only a default schedule. 
 
Most plans—95 out of 107—developed preferred schedules that called for 
contribution increases and, while the range of these increases varied 
widely among plans, some were quite high.24 As figure 3 shows, most 
plans proposed increases of 10 percent or more in the first year of the 
collective bargaining agreement, and a little over a quarter of plans 
proposed increases of 20 percent or more. The median first-year 
contribution increase was 12.5 percent. Overall, the range of first-year 
increases was quite broad however, ranging from less than 1 percent to 
225 percent. These data tell only a partial story, however, because 
rehabilitation plans may mandate a series of contribution increases in 
subsequent years. Of the eight critical status plans we contacted, the 
rehabilitation plans of seven increased contribution rates, and six of these 
specified a series of contribution increases over subsequent years. For 
example, one plan proposed contribution increases of 10 percent 
compounded annually over 10 years, so that at the end of this period, a 
                                                                                                                    
24 Unless otherwise noted, discussion of contribution increases and benefit cuts in the 
remainder of this section refers to those outlined in the preferred schedule of the 
rehabilitation plan.   
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contribution rate of $2.00 per hour, for example, would have been 
increased to $5.25 per hour, or by 162 percent.25 
Figure 3: Percentage Contribution Increases in Rehabilitation Plans in First Year 
 
Note: Of the 107 plans surveyed, these figures exclude the four “do nothing” plans that proposed 
neither to increase contributions nor reduce benefits, and two other plans for which preferred 
schedule data were not available. The contribution increases reflect those to be made in the first year 
of the subsequent collective bargaining agreement. 
 
Thirty-two plans developed rehabilitation plans that reduced the rate of 
future benefit accruals.26 As figure 4 illustrates, 15 of these plans reduced 
future benefit accruals by 40 percent or more, and another 12 plans 
reduced future benefit accruals 20-40 percent. The median reduction for 
all 32 plans was 38 percent. As with contribution increases, the survey 
data on reductions to benefit accrual rates paint only a partial picture. 
Reductions in the benefit accrual rate are more common among troubled 
multiemployer plans than these data show because such reductions were 
often made prior to the rehabilitation plan. For example, findings from the 
Segal Company’s survey show that, of the plans that expected to exit 
critical status within the specified timeframes, about one-third had cut 
                                                                                                                    
25 The 2013 tri-agency report found a similar pattern, reporting that summaries of 
rehabilitation plans in Form 5500 filings indicate that schedules adopted by many 
bargaining parties required contribution rate increases of 7 percent or more for an 
extended period. Multiemployer Pension Plans: Report to Congress Required by the 
Pension Protection Act of 2006. 
26 Workers accrue retirement benefits according to benefit formulas that vary widely 
depending on the plan. For example, a participant may earn a flat dollar amount for each 
year of service, or a percentage of the contributions required for a worker’s covered 
service. According to the Employee Benefit Research Institute, most multiemployer plans 
base benefits on length of service and not on their wage or salary level.  
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future accrual rates before preparation of the rehabilitation plan, either 
directly or by a plan amendment that excluded recent contribution 
increases from the benefit formula. 
Figure 4: Percentage Accrual Rate Reductions in Rehabilitation Plans 
 
 
Also, a large majority of plans—88 out of 107—reduced one or more 
types of the adjustable benefits as outlined by the PPA.27 Typically, these 
reductions applied to both vested but inactive and active participants, but 
some plans applied them to only one or the other.28 
 
 
 
 
 
Officials of seven of the eight critical status plans we contacted increased 
contributions rates, and several of these plans indicated that contribution 
                                                                                                                    
27 This data is roughly comparable to data reported in the 2013 tri-agency report, 
Multiemployer Pension Plans: Report to Congress Required by the Pension Protection Act 
of 2006. This report found that of 378 plans self-certifying as critical status in 2010, 96 
reduced only adjustable benefits, 42 reduced only future benefits, and 53 did both.  
28 As PBGC officials noted, the impact of these reductions depend on how many types of 
adjustable benefits were reduced as well as the number of participants affected.   
Plan Officials Indicated 
That Efforts to Improve 
Funding Will, in Some 
Cases, Require Significant 
Sacrifices by Employers 
and Active Participants 
Impact of Contribution 
Increases 
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increases could be absorbed without undue stress to the plan. For 
example, one plan representing maintenance workers proposed to 
increase the weekly employer contribution rate for each worker from 
$82.75 per employee in 2011 to $130.75 per employee in 2023, a 58 
percent increase over 12 years. While this makes some significant 
demands on employers, they are nonetheless in agreement, and the 
reaction of both employers and participants to the rehabilitation plan has 
been constructive. Similarly, officials of another plan covering sheet metal 
workers said that the annual contribution increases ranging from 30 
percent in 2009-2010 to 5.8 percent in 2015-2016 can be absorbed by 
plan employers without great difficulty. 
In contrast, officials of some plans and contributing employers we 
contacted said that contribution increases would have very severe 
negative effects on some employers and possibly the plan itself. For 
example, officials of one plan told us that a proposed series of annual 
increases of 10 percent (compounded) represents a significant increase 
in labor costs. Plan officials said contributing employers are competing 
against firms outside of the plan that do not have comparable pension or 
health insurance costs, and contribution increases put them at a 
competitive disadvantage. Similarly, an official of a long-distance trucking 
firm said that the high contribution rates of underfunded multiemployer 
plans have greatly affected this firm’s cost structure and damaged its 
competitive position in the industry. In other cases, plans may have been 
unable to increase contributions as much as necessary. For example, our 
review of one plan’s rehabilitation plan revealed that the 15 percent 
contribution increase resulted from a difficult balance between, among 
other factors, adequately funding the plan and avoiding excessive strain 
on employers. According to the plan administrator, plan trustees 
determined that many contributing employers were in financial distress 
and that a significant increase in contributions would likely lead to 
business failures or numerous withdrawals. After the rehabilitation plan 
was adopted, five employers withdrew from the plan. 
Contribution increases could have a significant impact on participating 
workers as well as employers because in some cases at least a portion of 
the increases will be funded through reductions in pay or other benefits. 
For example, officials of one large national plan with hundreds of 
contributing employers in a variety of industries told us that employers will 
pass a substantial part of the higher contributions to employees in the 
form of lower wages. They noted that workers’ wages have been stagnant 
for 10 years, so the need to return to full funding so quickly in accordance 
with the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) requirements is hurting 
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workers in the short term. More broadly, a recent report developed by a 
construction industry consortium notes that higher contributions make 
less money available for wage increases and other benefits. The report 
further notes that in some cases the additional contribution comes directly 
from the existing wage package, so a worker’s take home pay may 
remain stagnant or even be reduced.29 In other cases, the contribution 
increases will not have an immediate impact on participants’ pay, but will 
affect other portions of their benefit package. For example, one plan 
opted to increase pension contributions by diverting 2 percent of 
employers’ contributions from another benefit account. An official of 
another plan explained that the plan funded increased pension 
contributions by, for example, reducing contributions to a health benefit 
plan. Instead of directly reducing current wages, these actions will likely 
lead to higher health care costs or reduced benefits for employees. 
Among plans we contacted that had reduced future benefit accruals in 
recent years, the cumulative impact varied. For example, officials of one 
plan covering sheet metal workers explained that since 2003 the plan had 
reduced future benefit accruals by 75 percent per each dollar contributed 
to the plan. Another plan covering mine industry workers completely 
eliminated future benefit accruals for new, inexperienced miners hired on 
or after January 1, 2012, even though a contribution of $5.50 per hour of 
work will be made on their behalf. Another plan made no changes to 
benefit accrual rates but made a series of changes to eligibility and 
thresholds for retirement credits, with the result that some employees will 
have to work longer to accrue the same benefit they would have before 
adoption of the rehabilitation plan. 
The reduction or elimination of adjustable benefits, such as those outlined 
in table 3, were also significant and controversial in some cases. Officials 
of several of the plans that we contacted told us that the reduction or 
elimination of early retirement benefits for participants working in 
physically demanding occupations would be particularly difficult for some 
workers. As one official explained, working longer can be a grim scenario 
for older workers who have a hard time bearing the physical demands of 
labor, such as in a paper mill, for example. At the same time, some plans 
                                                                                                                    
29 Construction Employers DOL-EBSA/PBGC/Treasury Pension Report, Construction 
Employers for Responsible Pension Reform, December 22, 2011. An industry consortium 
prepared this report for the 3 federal agencies as the agencies prepared a report for 
Congress mandated by the PPA.  
Impact of Benefit Reductions 
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also eliminated or imposed limitations on disability retirement, so that, as 
officials of one plan noted, even workers who have developed physical 
limitations will have to either continue to work, or retire on substantially 
reduced benefits.30 Representatives of one plan said that there was 
considerable resistance from workers to the cuts in early retirement 
benefits. The officials explained, however, that these benefits had been 
established in the early 1990s when the plan was very well funded and 
that these promises had to be withdrawn in light of the plan’s current poor 
financial picture. 
Table 3: Selected Examples and Impact of Adjustable Benefits Reductions  
Adjustable benefit Examples of adjustable benefit reductions  Impact on participants 
Early retirement subsidy Increase in the early retirement penalty if a worker 
retired before age 65. 
Before rehabilitation plan, a 55-year old retiree could 
have obtained 90 percent of retirement benefit, but 
only about 45 percent thereafter.  
Disability retirement  Elimination of disability benefit for those not 
classified as disabled for purposes of the Social 
Security disability program.  
Worker would have to be totally disabled for work in 
order to receive a retirement benefit instead of 
disabled for current job only, such as physically 
demanding construction work.  
60-month and 120-month 
guarantees 
Elimination of guaranteed payment periods for full 
pension benefit to a designated beneficiary if a 
participant died within 60 months (5 years) or 120 
months (10 years) after retirement, depending on 
the applicable plan.  
Possible substantial reduction in retirement benefits 
to designated beneficiary of retiree. 
Elimination of subsidy for 
“pop-up” benefit  
Elimination of subsidy for “pop-up” benefit that 
would increase a participant’s benefit that had 
been reduced to pay for surviving spouse 
protection, if the spouse pre-deceases the 
participant.  
Possible substantial reduction in retirement benefits 
to retirees whose spouses pre-decease them.  
Source: Selected rehabilitation plans and communications with pension plan officials. 
 
Benefit reductions can affect employers as well as plan participants. For 
example, representatives of one construction industry plan told us that the 
reduced benefits outlined in the rehabilitation plan had reduced their 
ability to recruit and train new apprentices. These representatives 
explained that the prospect of earning only $50 of monthly retirement 
                                                                                                                    
30 Two plans reduced or eliminated disability retirement benefits for workers who are not 
disabled according to the criteria used by the Social Security Administration. As a result, 
instead of being disabled only for his or her current occupation in order to qualify for a 
disability retirement, the worker will have to obtain certification of disability under the 
Social Security program, which further requires a determination that a worker cannot 
adjust to other work due to his or her medical condition. 
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benefit per year of work—which after a 30-year career would result in only 
$1,500 payment per month in retirement—is not very appealing to 
prospective employees. While this does present a barrier to recruitment, a 
plan representative told us it is mitigated by an attractive hourly wage of 
$31.40, and the fact that many of the younger workers today are thankful 
for a paycheck in the current economic environment. 
Some rehabilitation plans also included provisions designed to protect the 
plan from employer withdrawals. For example, as table 4 outlines, two of 
the eight critical status plans we contacted impose much more severe 
benefit reductions on employees of firms that subsequently choose to 
withdraw from the plan. According to one of the rehabilitation plans, 
maintaining the contribution base of the pension plan is essential to the 
success of the rehabilitation plans and hence for plan participants and 
their families. Officials of this pension plan said that the pension plan 
cannot survive if it continues to lose contributing employers, and 
penalizing their employees is one way of discouraging withdrawals. 
Table 4: Examples of Benefit Cuts to Be Applied to Employees of Withdrawing 
Employers but Not to Those of Employers Remaining in the Plan 
 Benefit cuts  
Plan A • No eligibility for disability pension or early retirement subsidy 
• No availability of optional forms of pension, such as 120- 
month guarantee of payments to the beneficiary of a deceased participant 
• Elimination of pre-retirement death benefit 
Plan B All adjustable benefits eliminated, including 
• Any right to receive a retirement benefit before age 65 
• All disability benefits for those not yet receiving them 
• Pre-retirement death benefits, with one exceptiona 
• Post retirement death benefits that are not part of an annuity 
Source: Selected rehabilitation plans 
aElimination of the pre-retirement death benefit excludes the required surviving spouse annuity. 
 
 
The Segal survey of critical status plans indicates that while most plans 
aimed to eventually emerge from critical status, a significant number 
reported that they do not and instead project eventual insolvency. As 
figure 5 illustrates, of the 107 plans surveyed, about 67 expect to emerge 
from critical status within the statutory time frames of either 10 to 13 
years, and 12 others in an extended rehabilitation period. However, 28 of 
the surveyed plans had determined, as the authors of the survey noted, 
Measures Directed at 
Withdrawing Employers 
About 25 Percent of 
Critical Status Plans 
Surveyed Face Eventual 
Insolvency 
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that no realistic combination of contribution increases and benefit 
reductions would enable them to emerge from critical status, and that 
their best approach is to forestall insolvency for as long as possible. 
Among these plans, the average number of years to expected insolvency 
was 12, with some expecting insolvency in less than 5 years and others 
not for more than 30 years. The majority of these plans expected 
insolvency in 15 or fewer years. 
Figure 5: Plans’ Expectations about Emergence from Critical Status 
 
 
Among the plans we contacted, four expected to eventually become 
insolvent. In general, officials of these plans told us that a combination of 
massive investment losses and deterioration in contribution bases were 
primary causes of their financial difficulties. For example, officials of one 
plan cited the closure of paper mills from which the plan previously 
derived a substantial share of contributions as a cause of the plan’s 
financial distress. Officials of these plans explained that their analyses 
concluded that no feasible combination of contribution increases or 
benefit reductions could lead them back to a healthy level of funding. 
Several officials indicated that an effort to do so would likely accelerate 
the demise of the plan. For example, our review of plan documents 
revealed that the actuary of one fund determined that mathematically the 
fund would be able to emerge from critical status if contribution rates were 
increased by 24 percent annually for each of the next 10 years, ultimately 
increasing to a rate that would be about 859 percent of the then-current 
contribution rate. The trustees of this plan determined that such a 
proposal would be rejected by representatives of employers and workers, 
and would likely lead to negotiated withdrawals by plan employers. This, 
in turn, could result in insolvency of the plan, possibly as early as 2019. 
Instead, this plan opted for measures that officials believed are most likely 
to result in continued participation in the fund, yet which nonetheless are 
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projected to forestall insolvency until about 2029. Similarly, according to 
officials of another plan, plan trustees concluded that the significant 
contribution increases necessary to avoid insolvency were more than 
employers in that geographic area could bear. In addition, the plan 
considered the impact of funding the necessary contribution increases 
through reductions to base pay. The plan determined that this also would 
not be feasible because of the rising cost of living facing these employees 
and their families. Consequently, the plan trustees adopted a 
rehabilitation plan that forestalls insolvency until about 2025. 
Officials of plans that we contacted expressed a number of concerns 
about the future, including concerns about financial market returns, the 
overall economy, and the stability of contributing employers. For example, 
officials of one plan that expected to emerge from critical status within the 
next 10 years said that this could be impeded if investment returns were 
below expectations, and especially if another collapse in the financial 
markets occurs. Officials of the seven other critical status plans we 
contacted echoed this concern, and several mentioned that overall 
economic conditions affect hours worked and hence overall contributions. 
For example, officials of a plan covering construction industry workers 
expressed concerns that because of the economic downturn, the 
reduction in demand for infrastructure and construction maintenance work 
has greatly reduced the number of active workers in the plan. 
Finally, officials of several plans expressed concerns about attracting and 
retaining contributing employers. An official of a safe status or “green-
zone” plan, for example, said that it is essential that the plan continue to 
attract new employers and that the ability to do so is a key basis for the 
plan’s overall financial health. An official of a critical status plan that is 
attempting to forestall insolvency told us that it is very concerned about 
the financial well-being of its remaining contributing employers and that 
plan insolvency could be hastened if one of these employers were to fail 
or otherwise cease making contributions. As PBGC officials and a 
construction industry organization noted, because the contribution base of 
multiemployer plans can overlap, financial stress in one plan has the 
potential to spill over to other plans. If, for example, the burden of 
increased contributions in one plan causes a large employer economic 
distress, it may impair its ability to remain competitive as well as make 
sufficient contributions to other plans. As shown in figure 6, this contagion 
effect could negatively affect the funded status of other plans. 
Plans’ Concerns for the Future 
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Figure 6: Illustration of the Manner by Which Financial Distress in Multiemployer 
Plans May Spread to Other Employers and Plans 
 
 
If the events of coming years are more favorable than the assumptions on 
which rehabilitation plans are based, some plans may emerge from 
critical status earlier than planned, and some may be able to avoid 
insolvency. However, the opposite is true as well—if future events are 
less favorable than assumed, contributing employers and plan 
participants may have to make additional sacrifices or additional plans 
could face insolvency. Our discussions with eight critical status and two 
endangered status plans show that while some plans believed they had 
flexibility to make further adjustments, others did not. For example, 
officials of one plan trying to avoid insolvency said that even the 
contribution increases included in the funding improvement plan will be 
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very difficult to bear for employers and workers, and further concessions 
are not realistic. An official of a large national plan said that the ability of 
employers and participants to absorb more sacrifices varied considerably 
among the plan’s 900 participating groups, but that in general, additional 
concessions would be very difficult to accept. They said that it would 
almost certainly erode the plan’s contribution base, which would mean a 
slow progression towards insolvency. 
 
PBGC’s financial assistance to multiemployer plans has increased 
significantly in recent years, and projected plan insolvencies may exhaust 
PBGC’s multiemployer insurance fund. In fact, PBGC expects that, under 
current law, based on plans currently booked as liabilities (current and 
future probable plan insolvencies), the multiemployer insurance program 
is likely to become insolvent within the next 10 to 15 years, although the 
exact timing is uncertain and depends on key factors, such as investment 
returns and the timing of individual plan insolvencies. Additionally, PBGC 
estimates that if the projected insolvencies of either of two large 
multiemployer plans were to occur, the insurance fund would be 
completely exhausted within 2 to 3 years. While retirees of insolvent plans 
generally receive reduced monthly pension payments under the PBGC 
pension guarantee, this amount would be further reduced to an extremely 
small fraction of what PBGC guarantees, or nothing, if the multiemployer 
insurance fund were to be exhausted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As more multiemployer plans have become insolvent, the total amount of 
financial assistance PBGC has provided has increased markedly in 
recent years. Overall, for fiscal year 2012, PBGC provided $95 million in 
total financial assistance to help 49 insolvent plans cover pension benefits 
for about 51,000 plan participants. Generally, since 2001, the number of 
multiemployer plans needing financial assistance has steadily increased, 
as has the total amount of assistance PBGC has provided each year, 
slowing the increase in PBGC’s multiemployer insurance program funds. 
PBGC Provides 
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Guaranteed Retiree 
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Moreover, as figure 7 indicates, the number of plans needing PBGC’s 
help has increased significantly in recent years, from 33 plans in fiscal 
year 2006 to 49 plans in fiscal year 2012. Likewise, the amount of annual 
PBGC assistance to plans has increased from about $70.1 million in fiscal 
year 2006 to about $95 million in fiscal year 2012 (a decrease in 
assistance, due to fewer plan closeouts, compared with about $115 
million in fiscal year 2011). From fiscal years 2005 to 2006 alone, annual 
PBGC assistance increased from about $13.8 million to more than $70 
million. 
Figure 7: Multiemployer Plans Receiving PBGC Financial Assistance and Amounts Received, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2012 
 
 
Loans to insolvent plans comprise the majority of financial assistance that 
PBGC has provided to multiemployer plans.31 As figure 8 illustrates, 
based on available data from fiscal year 2011, loans to insolvent plans 
totaled $85.5 million and accounted for nearly 75 percent of total PBGC 
                                                                                                                    
31 Under Title IV of ERISA, a plan may be considered insolvent if it does not have enough 
assets to pay the PBGC-guaranteed benefits for a full plan year. An insolvent plan 
continues operations, and PBGC provides necessary financial assistance for payment of 
benefits at statutorily guaranteed levels and for reasonable administrative expenses. The 
amounts of financial assistance for plan partitions and mergers and closeouts fluctuate 
from year to year, so the amount of assistance for a particular fiscal year is not an 
indication of trends or amounts of assistance in prior years. 
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financial assistance. However, the loans are not likely to be repaid 
because the plans are insolvent. To date, only one plan has ever repaid a 
PBGC loan. In addition to providing loans to insolvent plans, PBGC 
provided $13.7 million in fiscal year 2011 to help support two plan 
partitions, which enabled those plans to carve out the benefit liabilities 
attributable to “orphaned” employees whose employers filed for 
bankruptcy, while keeping the remainders of the plans in operation.32 
Once a plan is partitioned, PBGC assumes the liability for paying benefits 
to the orphaned participants. Additionally, PBGC provided $15.1 million in 
fiscal year 2011 to help plan sponsors close out five plans, which occurs 
when plans either merge with other multiemployer plans or purchase 
annuities from private-sector insurers for their beneficiaries.33 Plans 
considering a merger must provide notice to PBGC and may request a 
compliance determination; PBGC officials said they carefully consider 
each merger to ensure that the merger would not result in a weaker 
combined plan than the separately constituted plans.34 
                                                                                                                    
32 A plan partition is a statutory mechanism by which a multiemployer plan can carve 
out—or partition—the plan liabilities attributable to “orphaned” employees of employers 
who have filed for bankruptcy. According to PBGC, orphaned participants may also 
include participants whose employers withdrew from a plan without filing bankruptcy. 
However, this group of participants would not be eligible for partitioning. 
33 According to PBGC officials, financial assistance to help plans close out is available 
only in limited circumstances: (1) if a plan’s net PBGC liability is generally under $5 
million, PBGC provides financial assistance to allow the plan to purchase insurance 
annuities, and (2) if a plan is expected to become insolvent within 10 years, PBGC may 
provide financial assistance to allow the plan to merge with another plan. 
34 A plan merger typically involves a plan with a lower assets-to-liability ratio and a plan 
with a higher assets-to-liability ratio. According to PBGC, plan closeouts help PBGC 
reduce plan administrative costs. 
 
  
 
 
 
Page 26 GAO-13-240  Private Pensions 
Figure 8: PBGC’s Financial Assistance to Multiemployer Plans, by Type and 
Amount, Fiscal Year 2011 (dollars in millions) 
 
 
PBGC monitors the financial condition of multiemployer plans to identify 
plans that are at risk of becoming insolvent and that may require its 
financial assistance from the multiemployer insurance program. Based on 
this monitoring, PBGC maintains a contingency list of plans that are likely 
to become insolvent and make a claim to PBGC’s multiemployer 
insurance program. PBGC classifies plans on its contingency list 
according to the plans’ risk of insolvency.35 PBGC also assesses the 
effect that insolvencies among the plans on the contingency list would 
have on the multiemployer insurance fund. Table 5 outlines the various 
classifications and definitions based on risk. 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
35 To determine which multiemployer plans belong in each of the contingency categories, 
PBGC uses a screening process that measures the financial health of plans based on a 
number of variables that include, among others: (1) the ratio of active participants (those 
for whom employers are continuing to make contributions) to other participants (those for 
whom plans are making or will soon make benefit payments), (2) the ratio of assets to the 
present value of vested benefits accrued by participants, and (3) the ratio of contributions 
to benefit payments.  
Potential Future Liabilities for 
PBGC 
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Table 5: Classifications of Plans on PBGC’s Contingency List 
(dollar in billions) 
Classification Definition FY 2012 Liabilitya 
Probable (Current) A plan that is known to be insolvent and has received or will begin 
receiving financial assistance from PBGC. 
$1.4  
Probable (Terminated Future) A terminated plan that may still have assets, but current assets and 
future collectible payments are projected to be insufficient to cover plan 
benefits plus expenses. 
$1.7  
Probable (Ongoing Future) An ongoing plan with a projected date of insolvency within 10 years. $3.9  
Reasonably Possible An ongoing plan with a projected date of insolvency between 10 and 20 
years in the future. 
$27.0 
Source: PBGC. 
aLiability represents the present value of PBGC’s potential liability to these plans. 
 
Both the number of multiemployer plans placed on PBGC’s contingency 
list and the amount of PBGC’s potential financial assistance obligations to 
those plans have increased steadily over time, with the greatest increases 
recorded in recent years. According to PBGC data, the number of plans 
where insolvency is classified as “probable”—plans that are already 
insolvent or are projected to become insolvent within 10 years—increased 
from 90 plans in fiscal year 2008 to 148 plans in fiscal year 2012. 
Similarly, the number of plans where insolvency is classified as 
“reasonably possible”—plans that are projected to become insolvent 10 to 
20 years in the future—increased from 1 in fiscal year 2008 to 13 in fiscal 
year 2012. 
Although the increase in the number of multiemployer plans on PBGC’s 
contingency list has risen sharply, the present value of PBGC’s potential 
liability to those plans has increased by an even greater factor.36 For 
example, as illustrated in figure 9, the present value of PBGC’s liability 
associated with “probable” plans increased from $1.8 billion in fiscal year 
2008 to $7.0 billion in fiscal year 2012. By contrast, for fiscal year 2012, 
PBGC’s multiemployer insurance fund only had $1.8 billion in total assets, 
resulting in net liability of $5.2 billion, as reported in PBGC’s 2012 annual 
report. 
                                                                                                                    
36 PBGC determines the present value by using certain assumptions about interest rates, 
among other things, to adjust the amount of future benefit payments to reflect the time 
value of money (by discounting) and the probability of payment (by means of decrements, 
such as for death or retirement).  
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Figure 9: Liability from Probable Multiemployer Plan Insolvencies on PBGC’s Contingency List, Fiscal Years 2000 through 
2012 
 
 
Although PBGC’s cash flow is currently positive—because premiums and 
investment returns on multiemployer insurance fund assets exceed 
benefit payments and other assistance—PBGC expects plan insolvencies 
to more than double by 2017, placing greater demands on the 
multiemployer insurance fund and further weakening PBGC’s overall 
financial position.37 
PBGC expects that the pension liabilities associated with current and 
future plan insolvencies will exhaust the multiemployer insurance fund. 
Under one projection using conservative (i.e., somewhat pessimistic) 
assumptions for budgeting purposes, PBGC officials reported that the 
agency’s projected financial assistance payments for plan insolvencies 
that have already occurred or are considered probable in the next 10 
                                                                                                                    
37 PBGC’s primary sources of cash inflow are from insurance premiums paid by 
multiemployer plans and subsequent investment earnings from those premiums. Cash 
outflows primarily comprise financial assistance to insolvent and near-insolvent plans. 
Potential Exhaustion of 
Multiemployer Insurance Fund 
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years would exhaust the multiemployer insurance fund in or about 2023.38 
PBGC officials said that the precise timing of program insolvency is 
difficult to predict due to uncertainty about key assumptions, such as 
investment returns and the timing of individual plan insolvencies. Based 
on a range of estimates provided by multiple projections, PBGC officials 
said the multiemployer insurance program is likely to become insolvent 
within the next 10 to 15 years. Furthermore, exhaustion of the insurance 
fund may occur sooner because the financial health of two large 
multiemployer plans has deteriorated. According to PBGC officials, the 
two large plans for which insolvency is “reasonably possible,” have 
projected insolvency 10 to 20 years in the future. PBGC estimates that, 
for fiscal year 2012, the liability from these two plans accounted for $26 
billion of the $27 billion in liability of plans in the “reasonably possible” 
category. Taken in combination, the number of retirees and beneficiaries 
of these two plans would represent about a six-fold increase in the 
number of people receiving guarantee payments in 2012. PBGC officials 
said that the insolvency of either of these two large plans would exhaust 
the insurance fund in 2 to 3 years. 
 
                                                                                                                    
38 PBGC projects potential insolvency dates using varying methodological approaches 
and assumptions about the future and assuming no changes in law. According to PBGC 
officials, the 2023 insolvency date is based on a deterministic projection of financial 
assistance payments for plans booked as liabilities on PBGC’s financial statements as of 
September 30, 2012, using conservative assumptions, including for rates of return on plan 
assets and immediate and continued reductions in active participant counts and employer 
contributions in ongoing plans. PBGC’s FY2012 Exposure Report uses the ME-PIMS 
stochastic model, which is based on a sample of all plans in the multiemployer universe, 
including a sample of booked liabilities, and a separate set of assumptions. This model 
projects a 52 percent chance of program insolvency by 2023, which rises to about 85 
percent by 2028. For other purposes, PBGC officials said they use a cash flow projection 
methodology based on financial assistance payments for all booked plans and for 
projected future booked plans (using mean values resulting from a stochastic projection). 
PBGC officials said that no matter which method is used, estimated program insolvency 
dates are relatively close.  
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Generally, retirees who are participants in insolvent plans receive 
reduced pension benefits under PBGC’s statutory pension guarantee 
formula. In most cases, PBGC’s pension guarantee (see fig. 10) does not 
offer full coverage of the monthly pension benefits that a retiree of an 
insolvent plan has actually earned. When a multiemployer plan becomes 
insolvent and relies on PBGC loans to pay for benefit payments to plan 
retirees, retirees will most likely see a reduction in their monthly pension 
benefits.39 PBGC uses a formula that calculates the maximum PBGC 
benefit guarantee based on the amount of a plan participant’s pension 
benefit accrual rate and years of credit service earned. For example, if a 
retiree has earned 30 years of credit service, the maximum coverage 
under the PBGC guarantee is about $1,073 per month, which yields an 
annual pension benefit of $12,870. 
                                                                                                                    
39 The guaranteed benefit amount is a function of the participant’s accrual rate, and is 
calculated as the participant’s monthly benefit amount divided by his or her years of 
service. PBGC’s multiemployer program guarantees 100 percent of the first $11 per 
month per year of service plus 75 percent of the next $33, or $35.75 maximum per month 
per year of service. 29 U.S.C. § 1322a(c). 
Benefits of Many Retirees 
Are Reduced under PBGC 
Guarantees, and May Be 
Further Reduced If PBGC 
Multiemployer Insurance 
Program Becomes 
Insolvent 
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Figure 10: Hypothetical Illustration of Guaranteed Benefit Levels under PBGC’s Multiemployer Insurance Program 
 
Note: Although the PBGC maximum monthly benefit based on a 30-year working career is about 
$1,073, as this chart shows, a greater benefit can be earned if a worker retires after a longer career. 
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Generally, retirees receiving the highest pensions experience the 
steepest cuts when their plans become insolvent and their benefits are 
limited by the pension guarantees. According to PBGC, in 2009, the 
average monthly pension benefit received by retirees in all multiemployer 
plans was $821.40 However, as shown by PBGC in a hypothetical 
illustration of benefit distributions (see fig. 11), the line that spans the bar 
chart indicates that the range of pension benefits varies widely across 
retirees, and, with $692 as the median pension, about half of the plan’s 
retirees will experience 15 percent or greater reductions in their pensions 
under the PBGC guarantee. Additionally, under this illustration, one out of 
five retirees will experience 50 percent or greater reductions in their 
pensions under the PBGC guarantee. Ultimately, regardless of how long 
a retiree has worked and the amount of monthly benefits earned, any 
reduction in pension benefits—no matter the amount—may have 
significant effects on retirees’ living standards. 
                                                                                                                    
40 The average monthly benefit was determined by dividing benefits paid under all plans 
by the number of retired participants under all plans. However, the average is somewhat 
inflated because benefits paid during the year include lump-sum payments (mostly $5,000 
or less). Additionally, the average monthly benefit received in 2009 is slightly higher for 
plans in the transportation industry ($1,120), where an annual benefit can reach $30,000 
or more for a plan participant with 30 years of service. On the other hand, the average 
monthly benefit is lower ($642) for plans in the retail trade and service industries. 
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Figure 11: Hypothetical Illustration of the Effects of Guaranteed Monthly Pension Benefit Levels under PBGC’s Multiemployer 
Insurance Program 
 
Note: According to PBGC, the figure provides a comparison of the relative frequency of different 
benefit levels to the portion of the benefit that is covered by the PBGC multiemployer program 
guarantee. The figure summarizes information on participants already retired under a large 
hypothetical multiemployer plan that has relatively generous benefits. Benefit amounts are 
represented by the bars while the number of participants receiving benefit amounts in a given 
grouping is indicated by the purple line. The height of each bar is the average benefit amount in the 
grouping. The bottom half of each bar indicates the portion of pensions guaranteed by PBGC, and the 
top half of each bar indicates the portion of pensions not guaranteed by PBGC. 
 
According to PBGC, in the event that the multiemployer insurance fund is 
exhausted, affected participants then relying on the PBGC pension 
guarantee would receive an extremely small fraction of their already-
reduced guarantees or, potentially, nothing. According to PBGC officials, 
once the insurance fund’s cash balance is depleted, the agency would 
have to rely solely on the annual insurance premium receipts, which 
totaled $92 million for fiscal year 2012. The precise effect that the 
insolvency of the multiemployer insurance fund would have on retirees 
receiving the PBGC guaranteed benefit depends on a number of 
factors—primarily the number of guaranteed benefit recipients and 
PBGC’s annual premium income at that time. The impact would, 
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however, likely be severe. For example, if the insurance fund were to be 
drained by the insolvency of one very large and troubled plan, under one 
scenario, we estimate that the benefits paid by PBGC would be reduced 
to less than 10 percent of the PBGC guarantee level. In this scenario, a 
retiree who once received a monthly pension of $2,000 and whose 
pension was reduced to $1,251 under the PBGC guarantee, would see 
the monthly pension income further reduced to less than $125, or less 
than $1,500 per year. Additional plan insolvencies would further depress 
already drastically reduced income levels. Our contacts with plan officials 
and other stakeholders also suggested that the exhaustion of the PBGC 
multiemployer insurance fund would have effects well beyond direct 
financial impacts. For example, officials of another plan said that the 
exhaustion of the insurance fund could bring about the loss of public 
confidence in the multiemployer plan system’s ability to provide retirement 
security for plan participants and their beneficiaries. 
 
Experts and stakeholders we interviewed cited two key policy options to 
avoid the insolvencies of severely underfunded plans and the PBGC 
multiemployer insurance fund, and a number of other options for longer 
term reform of the multiemployer system (see fig. 12). To address the 
impending insolvency crisis, they proposed allowing severely troubled 
plans to reduce accrued benefits, including benefits of retirees, and 
providing PBGC with additional resources to prevent insolvencies that 
might otherwise threaten the fund. Longer term options would provide 
plans with flexibilities and resources to help attain financial stability in the 
future. These include encouraging the adoption of flexible benefit designs 
and reforming withdrawal liability policies.41 
                                                                                                                    
41 The NCCMP’s February 2013 report also offered a series of recommendations that 
address some of the proposals discussed in this section. In addition, it also includes a 
series of recommended technical refinements to the PPA that were beyond the scope of 
this report. For example, the report advocates that plans that reasonably expect to enter 
critical status in the next five plan years be permitted to enter critical status in the current 
plan year.  
Key Options to 
Reduce Liabilities and 
Change Plan Designs 
Could Help Improve 
Financial Stability, but 
Pose Trade-offs 
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Figure 12: Key Federal Policy Options and Possible Effects on Key Stakeholders 
 
aWe recognize there may also be secondary effects from these policy options. For example, reducing 
accrued benefits may result in a greater use of and reliance on Medicaid and other federal benefits. 
An indirect effect of some of these policy options could be to reduce PBGC’s exposure to potential 
liabilities. 
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Various experts and plan representatives stressed the necessity of 
modifying ERISA’s anti-cutback rule to allow severely distressed plans to 
reduce the accrued benefits of active participants as well as retirees.42 
They noted that this flexibility is essential because 1) the most severely 
distressed plans will be unable to avoid insolvency using traditional 
methods—increasing employer contributions and/or reducing future 
benefit accruals or adjustable benefits—and 2) benefit reductions will 
occur in any case and will be more severe in the event of plan insolvency, 
especially in the event of the insolvency of PBGC’s multiemployer 
insurance fund. As described in the first section of this report, the most 
severely distressed plans we contacted have already adjusted 
contributions and benefits and several stated that further adjustments 
would accelerate plan insolvency. In particular, the demographics of 
many multiemployer plans limit their ability to reduce liabilities through 
contribution increases or reductions in future benefit accruals because 
they are typically based on hours worked. For example, the majority of 
participants in one of the largest multiemployer plans have already retired 
or are inactive and no longer contributing to the plan—as of 2012, the 
plan had about 4.86 retired or otherwise inactive participants for every 
active worker. In light of the sacrifices already made by active 
participants—some of whom are absorbing the cost of significant 
contributions to support benefit payments at a level they will likely never 
see for themselves—some stakeholders noted that adjustments of retiree 
benefits would be equitable. Moreover, experts, as well as employer and 
plan representatives also noted that allowing plans to reduce accrued 
benefits now could avoid more severe reductions in the future. For 
example, representatives from an association of actuaries and from a 
                                                                                                                    
42 26 U.S.C. § 411(d)(6) and 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g). 
Allowing Plans to Reduce 
Accrued Benefits Could 
Help Severely 
Underfunded Plans Avert 
Insolvency, but Some 
Experts Said Severity of 
Cuts May Warrant Federal 
Assistance 
Allow Plans Facing Insolvency 
to Reduce Accrued Benefits 
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large plan noted that for some plans, the alternative to reductions in 
accrued benefits is eventual plan insolvency, which would result in the 
much lower benefit level guaranteed by PBGC compared to the current 
benefits paid and, possibly, little to no benefit at all if PBGC’s 
multiemployer insurance fund became insolvent. Finally, some experts 
and a plan representative stressed the urgency of obtaining such 
flexibility because the longer the delay, the greater the eventual required 
benefit reductions. 
Nonetheless, allowing plans the flexibility to reduce accrued benefits for 
current workers and retirees would significantly compromise one of the 
founding principles of ERISA and could impose significant hardship on 
some retirees. While some plan representatives and other stakeholders 
told us that a very modest benefit reduction would be sufficient to avoid 
insolvency, others noted that reductions would be very painful for retirees 
who worked for many years and planned their retirements around a 
promised benefit.43 Representatives of one of these plans referred to 
appeal letters to the plan that had been submitted by participants and/or 
their spouses, noting that older workers or retirees can be in some 
financially difficult situations, and cuts to accrued benefits would deepen 
and increase the number of such hardships. Some also noted that while 
younger retirees may be able to obtain employment to supplement 
income, older retirees, especially in physically demanding industries like 
mining and construction would likely not have that option. Finally, some 
stakeholders indicated that the flexibility to reduce accrued benefits would 
harm the multiemployer system by undermining the credibility of 
multiemployer plans and diminishing their ability to attract and retain 
employers and participants. 
Plan representatives and experts we contacted proposed a number of 
considerations and limitations that could mitigate some concerns with 
allowing plans to reduce accrued benefits. As described in table 6, these 
measures include eligibility criteria and options for oversight, along with 
other key features. For example, given the sacrifice it would impose on 
                                                                                                                    
43 For example, several stakeholders told us some plans could avoid insolvency by 
eliminating an additional monthly benefit payment known as a “13th check.” According to 
representatives from one plan, these additional benefits were added during the strong 
equities market of the 1990s in order to avoid additional tax liabilities due to overfunding 
and, to the extent the additional benefits are part of the accrued benefit, the plan does not 
have the flexibility to rescind this benefit under current law.  
 
  
 
 
 
Page 38 GAO-13-240  Private Pensions 
participants, several experts and plan representatives said that allowing 
reductions in accrued benefits should only be considered as a last resort 
for plans headed for insolvency. 
Table 6: Key Features of Proposals to Allow Severely Underfunded Plans to Reduce Accrued Benefits 
 NCCMP Commission proposals 
Plan representatives 
and industry experts proposals 
Eligibility criteria • Actuarial determination would be needed to 
show that benefit reductions avert plan 
insolvency. 
 
• Plans should demonstrate the financial necessity 
of benefit reductions, e.g., certification that plan 
is headed for insolvency or a cash flow test.  
Nature and extent of 
reductions 
• Accrued benefits may be reduced at most to 
110% of the PBGC guarantee. 
• Reductions in accrued benefits should be limited 
to a level tied to the PBGC guarantee (suggested 
level varied from 100% to 125% of the PBGC 
guarantee). 
Implementation • Benefit reductions would be determined by 
plan trustees in concert with the collective 
bargaining process. 
• Any future benefit increases would be 
accompanied by a comparable restoration of 
accrued benefits that were reduced. 
• Plan trustees are best placed to decide how 
benefit cuts should be implemented. 
• Protections for vulnerable populations should be 
considered (e.g., oldest or disabled participants, 
those with lower benefits). 
Oversight • PBGC could review proposed cuts to ensure 
established criteria are met (e.g., benefit 
reductions are equitably distributed and 
protections are in place for most vulnerable 
populations). 
• PBGC, Labor, or IRS could perform oversight. 
Source: GAO analysis of interviews and documentation from NCCMP and interviews with plan representatives and industry experts. In 
addition to the NCCMP effort, a representative from an employer in the transportation industry said they are working with other 
employers in that industry to develop a proposal to address multiemployer plan funding challenges, but it was still in progress at the 
time this report was written. 
 
Even with these protections and considerations, the flexibility to reduce 
accrued benefits would not occur without considerable sacrifice, and may 
not be sufficient to help some plans avoid insolvency. Several plan 
representatives and experts said the suggested benchmark for reducing 
accrued benefits—PBGC’s guarantee level of $12,870 on an annual basis 
for 30 years of service—is relatively low and could result in steep benefit 
cuts. For example, given the magnitude of financial challenges facing 
some severely underfunded plans, accrued benefits may be reduced by 
one-third or more of their original value. Moreover, in the case of at least 
one plan, PBGC officials said that reductions to the maximum guaranteed 
level may still not represent sufficient savings to avert insolvency. For 
example, representatives of one large plan told us that while reducing 
accrued benefits might be an option for some plans, it was not an option 
for their plan because the benefits were already quite modest—average 
retirement benefits in 2010 were about $600 per month. Further, plan 
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representatives said it would be unconscionable to reduce benefits for a 
retiree with a work-related illness, such as a respiratory ailment, who may 
be barely surviving on current benefit levels. 
According to several experts, in an effort to save plans and conserve 
PBGC assets in the long term, PBGC could provide financial assistance 
to qualifying plans headed for insolvency through a partition. If a plan 
qualifies and its application is approved by PBGC, the partition population 
includes only orphaned participants—those whose employer left the plan 
due to bankruptcy—and their benefits are reduced to the guaranteed 
level.44 According to industry experts, partitions would allow plans with a 
substantial share of orphaned liabilities to avoid further benefit reductions 
for active participants and other beneficiaries. By removing the burden of 
the legacy costs associated with orphaned participants, the plan would be 
in a better position to adequately fund benefit obligations with ongoing 
contributions. In addition, one expert said that partitions could reduce the 
total liability for PBGC because extending the solvency of the plan means 
that fewer participants would rely on benefit payments from the PBGC 
than if the whole plan were to become insolvent. 
While partitions may prevent qualifying plans from becoming insolvent, 
neither PBGC’s current partitioning authority nor its financial resources 
are sufficient to address the impending insolvency of large, severely 
underfunded plans. In its entire history, PBGC has performed partitions 
for only two plans.45 According to PBGC officials, plan representatives, 
and experts, there are a number of reasons why partitions have not been 
more widely used: 
                                                                                                                    
44 29 U.S.C. § 1413 specifies the following criteria a plan must meet to qualify for a 
partition: 1) a substantial reduction in the amount of aggregate contributions under the 
plan has resulted or will result from a case or proceeding under title 11 United States 
Code (Bankruptcy) with respect to an employer, 2) plan is likely to become insolvent, 3) 
contributions will have to be increased significantly in reorganization to meet the minimum 
contribution requirement and prevent insolvency, and 4) partition would significantly 
reduce the likelihood that the plan will become insolvent. 
45 In addition to an earlier partition of the Council 30 of the Retail, Wholesale, and 
Department Stores Union plan, PBGC partitioned the Chicago Truck Drivers Union 
Pension Plan in 2010. In each case, rather than administering the plan directly, PBGC 
provides sufficient funding to the plan to pay the orphaned beneficiaries guaranteed 
benefits, along with relevant administrative expenses. 
Financial Assistance to Prevent 
Insolvency 
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• The magnitude of potential reductions for orphaned participants has 
dissuaded some plans from applying for help. Payments for the 
partitioned population will be reduced to the PBGC guarantee level, 
which could be a sizable reduction in some cases. 
• PBGC does not have sufficient resources to cover orphaned liabilities 
of large severely underfunded plans. 
• Plans may not meet the four statutory criteria to be eligible for a 
partition. For example, a plan must demonstrate that it is headed for 
insolvency due to a reduction in contributions due to employer 
bankruptcies, which numerous plan representatives and experts said 
may exclude plans in need of assistance. Some plan representatives 
said that many of their contributing employers are small businesses 
that do not have the wherewithal to go through formal bankruptcy 
proceedings, but instead close without paying their full share of 
liabilities. In other cases, contributing employers may have left when 
the plan was adequately funded, but, as a result of the market crash 
in 2008, the funded status deteriorated. Consequently, the plan is not 
able to collect any ongoing contributions from those employers to 
offset the poor investment returns, but the plan is still responsible for 
paying the full amount of vested benefits for their workers. 
While the reasons employers leave a plan may vary, their departure can 
result in significant legacy costs that experts said impair the ability of the 
plan to remain solvent or recover from funding shortfalls. For example, 
according to officials from one of the largest plans, about 40 percent of 
benefit payments go to orphaned participants and current employer 
contributions amounted to only about 25 percent of total annual benefit 
payments as of 2009. To address this issue, several experts said that 
partitions should be made more widely available so that, for example, 
orphaned liabilities could include any participants whose contributing 
employer left the plan without paying their full share of unfunded vested 
benefits. However, to cover the cost of these benefits, several experts 
noted that PBGC would need additional funding—the agency does not 
have nearly sufficient resources to pay even the reduced benefit levels for 
potential partition populations from some large plans. 
As an example, representatives of one of the largest plans for which 
insolvency is reasonably possible in the mining industry indicated they 
may not be eligible for assistance through a partition because the plan 
was sufficiently funded until the 2008 financial crisis. In the absence of a 
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partition, some members of Congress have proposed financial assistance 
using an existing separate source of funds established from reclamation 
fees paid by coal companies for abandoned coal mines.46 According to 
plan representatives, this fund currently provides money to pay for health 
benefits of three related plans, which have not used the full amount of 
those funds. The proposal would transfer any remaining funds that are 
not needed for health benefits to improve the solvency of the pension 
plan.47 The representatives also noted that this financial assistance is 
essential and the only way the plan can avoid insolvency. Pension 
benefits for this plan are relatively low—retirees received an average 
pension of about $600 a month in 2010, which limits the plan’s ability to 
improve its funded status even if reductions to accrued benefits were 
allowed. 
Numerous industry experts and plan representatives emphasized the 
importance of providing timely assistance to severely underfunded plans, 
but some experts also cited drawbacks of providing additional financial 
assistance beyond PBGC’s multiemployer insurance fund. Regarding 
advantages, several experts and plan representatives said providing 
additional financial assistance sooner rather than later could prevent 
entire plans from going insolvent and reduce the number of participants 
relying on guaranteed payments from PBGC in the long term. Beyond the 
scope of an individual plan, representatives from a construction industry 
group said additional financial assistance could also prevent more 
widespread negative effects. Because employers across various 
industries contribute to some of the large severely underfunded 
multiemployer plans, as well as other plans, the continued decline of such 
a plan could trigger a contagion effect. Contributing employers may face 
large liabilities (e.g., increased contributions, increased withdrawal 
liability) that could prevent them from fulfilling obligations to other 
currently well-funded plans and some employers may be forced out of 
                                                                                                                    
46 H.R. 5479, 111th Cong. (2010). Other sources of federal assistance may also be 
considered. For example, prior proposed legislation included a provision for diverting 
funds from PBGC’s single-employer program to provide assistance to multiemployer 
plans. S. 3157, 111th Cong. (2010). However, as we have previously reported, PBGC’s 
single-employer program also faces significant long run financial challenges and the 
program has been on GAO’s high risk list since 2003. See GAO, High-Risk Series: An 
Update, GAO-11-278 (Washington, D.C.: February 2011), 150-153 and Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation: Single-Employer Pension Insurance Program Faces Significant 
Long-Term Risks, GAO-04-90 (Washington, D.C.: October 29, 2003). 
47 Coal Accountability and Retired Employee Act of 2010 (CARE Act), H.R. 5479. 
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business. Moreover, a plan representative and an expert said additional 
financial assistance is necessary to prevent the insolvency of the 
multiemployer insurance program, which, as described in the previous 
section, would leave thousands of participants with a small fraction of 
their vested pension benefits. However, other experts cited drawbacks for 
providing additional financial assistance. In particular, some experts said 
that a partition may not be a permanent fix for the plan. For example, if 
the on-going portion of the plan continues to lose employers, it may still 
become insolvent and require financial assistance from PBGC. In 
addition, some experts expressed concern about the size of the burden 
federal financial assistance could potentially place on taxpayers.48 
Considering the resources that may be needed to provide financial 
assistance to troubled plans, PBGC and others have identified increased 
premiums as a potential source of additional revenue for PBGC.49 
According to projections in a recent PBGC report, doubling the insurance 
premium from the current level of $12 per participant to $24 per 
participant would reduce the likelihood of PBGC insurance fund 
insolvency in 2022 from about 37 percent to about 22 percent.50 The 
analysis also found that a tenfold increase to $120 per participant would 
virtually eliminate the likelihood of multiemployer insurance fund 
insolvency by 2022, although the analysis did not look beyond that 
timeframe.51 
                                                                                                                    
48 For example, according to representatives from one large severely underfunded plan, 
total vested benefits attributable to participants whose employer left the plan without 
paying their full share of withdrawal liability was $2.7 billion as of 2009. The plan’s total 
vested benefits amounted to $6.7 billion in 2009.  
49 While this report was submitted for agency comments, the House Subcommittee on 
Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions held a hearing on challenges facing 
multiemployer plans on March 5, 2013 where the issue of further raising premiums was 
discussed. Starting in 2013, premiums paid by multiemployer plans increased from $9 per 
participant to $12 per participant and are indexed thereafter. Premiums for multiemployer 
plans are considerably lower than for single-employer plans commensurate with the lower 
benefit guarantee for multiemployer plans. In addition, unlike with single-employer plans, 
contributing employers in multiemployer plans act as the principal guarantor while PBGC 
is the guarantor of last resort. 
50PBGC Insurance of Multiemployer Pension Plans: Report to Congress Required by the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation, Washington D.C., January 2013. 
51 In their report, PBGC neither proposed nor recommended the adoption of increased 
premiums for the multiemployer program. 
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However, some stakeholders we spoke with noted that increased 
premiums also have limitations and drawbacks. Some stakeholders said 
further premium increases alone were not a feasible solution because 
they would be insufficient to solve PBGC’s long-term funding shortfall and 
would further stress employers in severely underfunded plans who have 
already borne considerable contribution increases. According to a PBGC 
analysis, even a ten-fold increase in the current premium would not 
prevent significant growth in the agency’s deficit. Under this analysis, 
PBGC estimates that the FY2012 deficit of $5.2 billion would still nearly 
triple, amounting to about $15 billion in 2022. Moreover, it is unclear what 
impact such premium increases would have on plans of varying financial 
health, especially plans seeking to delay eventual insolvency. PBGC 
officials acknowledged that, although premiums are generally not a 
significant percentage of plan costs, the most severely underfunded plans 
may not be able to afford any increases. PBGC officials also said that, 
given the range of financial circumstances across plans, a premium 
structure that would ensure affordable and appropriate premiums for all 
plans could help address this concern. In prior work, we assessed 
changing the premium structure for PBGC’s single-employer program to 
allow premiums to vary based on risk.52 However, we have not assessed 
the implications or implementation of increased premiums or a risk-based 
premium structure for PBGC’s multiemployer program. Given the 
distinctive features of the multiemployer plan design and program 
described earlier in this report, the development of a risk-based premium 
structure for multiemployer plans would entail unique considerations and 
require further analysis. 
 
                                                                                                                    
52 In 2012, we reported on challenges facing PBGC’s single-employer program and its 
premium structure and recommended that Congress consider authorizing a redesign of 
PBGC’s premium structure to more fully reflect the risk posed by plans and sponsors to 
the agency. For more information, see: GAO, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: 
Redesigned Premium Structure Could Better Align Rates with Risk from Plan Sponsors, 
GAO-13-58 (Washington, D.C.: November 2012). 
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ERISA requires that employers wishing to withdraw from a multiemployer 
plan pay for their share of the plan’s unfunded liabilities. As explained in 
the following text box, this requirement for withdrawal liability payments is 
intended to prevent employers from walking away from liabilities they 
have created, and, thus, help protect plan participants and other 
employers. However, despite the necessity of such a safeguard, plan 
representatives and other industry experts said changes are needed to 
address key challenges related to current provisions regarding withdrawal 
liability. 
Withdrawal Liability 
In the event an employer seeks to leave a multiemployer plan and the plan has a funding shortfall, the employer is liable 
for its share of unfunded plan benefits, known as withdrawal liability. A plan can choose from several formulas 
established in the law for determining the amount of unfunded vested benefits allocable to a withdrawing employer and 
the employer’s share of that liability.a Under three of these formulas, the employer’s proportional share is based on the 
employer’s share of contributions over a specified period.b In addition, the plan can apply for approval from PBGC to use 
variations on these methods. Liabilities that cannot be collected from a withdrawing employer, for example, one in 
bankruptcy, are to be “rolled over” and eventually funded by the plan’s remaining employers—frequently referred to as 
orphaned liabilities. As we previously reported, this means that an employer’s pension liabilities can become a function 
of the financial health of other employer plan sponsors.c These additional sources of potential liability can be difficult to 
predict, increasing employers’ level of uncertainty and risk. However, while the total amount of withdrawal liability is 
based on the unfunded vested benefits for the plan as a whole, a particular employer’s annual payments are strictly 
based on its own contributions and are generally subject to a 20-year cap.d  
Source: GAO analysis of ERISA and PBGC documents and prior GAO reports. 
a Vested benefits are nonforfeitable benefits for which the participant has satisfied the conditions of entitlement. Unfunded vested 
benefits are the difference between the present value of a plan’s vested benefits and the value of plan assets, based on reasonable 
actuarial methods and assumptions selected by the plan. (In the case of a mass withdrawal, PBGC specifies the methods and 
assumptions to be used.) 
b Under a fourth method, an employer’s withdrawal liability is based on the benefits and assets attributable to service with the 
employer (and a proportional share of unattributable amounts). 
c GAO-04-423, p. 23. 
d In cases of a mass withdrawal whereby the plan is terminated when all remaining employers exit the plan, the 20-year cap is 
eliminated. 
 
Changes to Plan Design 
and Other Options Could 
Address Challenges of 
Withdrawal Liability and 
Improve Long-Term 
Financial Stability 
Addressing the Problems 
Associated with Withdrawal 
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Current federal withdrawal liability policies give rise to three main 
problems, according to stakeholders and experts. First, plans often collect 
far less than the full value of liabilities owed to the plan. In the event of an 
employer bankruptcy, several experts said plan sponsors often collect 
little or no withdrawal liability payments. For example, several experts 
explained that in the recent Hostess Brands bankruptcy, the firm—a 
contributing employer to many plans—is likely to pay very little of its 
withdrawal liability obligations. One service provider said this bankruptcy 
doubled the unfunded liabilities attributable to remaining employers in 
some plans. Separately, the method of calculating withdrawal liability 
payments may not capture an employer’s full share of unfunded liabilities 
because a plan’s withdrawal liability obligation is based on its prior 
contributions rather than on attributed liabilities, and is also subject to a 
20-year cap.53 In particular, some stakeholders said the 20-year cap on 
withdrawal liability payments limits the amount of money collected by 
plans. If the amount of the employer’s prior contributions is small relative 
to the size of their total withdrawal liability, the annual payments may not 
be sufficient to pay off their total withdrawal liability over the 20-year 
period. 
Second, existing withdrawal liability rules deter new employers from 
joining a plan with existing unfunded liabilities. Plan representatives said 
attracting new employers is essential to the long-term health of the plan, 
but an employer group said the existence of potential withdrawal liability 
strongly deters prospective employers who may otherwise want to join. 
Moreover, fear of greater withdrawal liability in the future may encourage 
current contributing employers to leave the plan. For example, in late 
2007, UPS paid about $6 billion to withdraw from one of the largest 
multiemployer plans. 
Third, the presence of withdrawal liability can negatively affect an 
employer’s credit rating and ability to obtain loans for their business. For 
example, representatives from one large employer said their total 
withdrawal liability exceeds the net worth of their company and this has 
made it difficult for them to obtain loans and other financing, which might 
                                                                                                                    
53 Except in cases of a mass withdrawal, withdrawal liability payments are subject to a 20-
year cap. Thus, even if the annual payments made, which are based on the employer’s 
previous contribution level, for the 20-year period are insufficient to cover the cost of the 
employer’s withdrawal liability, they are not obligated to pay the remainder of the amount 
of unfunded vested benefits. 
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help revitalize their business. Table 7 describes options to address these 
problems identified through our contacts with various stakeholders, 
including plan and employer representatives. 
Table 7: Options to Address Challenges Associated with Withdrawal Liability 
Source: GAO analysis of documentation and interviews with plan representatives, industry experts, and NCCMP. 
 
A comprehensive remedy to the problems arising from withdrawal liability 
is particularly elusive because a solution to one issue can exacerbate 
another. For example, eliminating the current 20-year cap may help allow 
plans to collect withdrawal liability payments until the full amount has 
Option Benefits Tradeoffs / Limits on Effectiveness 
Increase assets recovered by plan 
Improve status of plan in bankruptcy 
proceedings 
Plan would be better positioned to collect a 
higher share of the liabilities owed by the 
bankrupt employer 
Amount of withdrawal liability collected may 
still be far short of total unfunded liabilities 
Eliminate 20-year cap on withdrawal liability 
payments 
Plan may be able to collect a greater share 
of liabilities owed by a withdrawing 
employer 
• Unclear how many employers would 
be able to continue making payments 
beyond 20 years 
• Increased amount of withdrawal 
liability a plan can collect may also 
deter employers from joining the plan 
Reduce deterrent effect on contributing employers 
Exclude increased contributions required 
by funding improvement or rehabilitation 
plans from withdrawal liability calculations  
Plan may improve its funded status by 
eliminating a disincentive for employers to 
increase contributions  
Plan sacrifices the amount of withdrawal 
liability it can collect 
Clarify that withdrawal liability will not be 
assessed to employers that voluntarily 
remain in the plans  
• Mitigate impact of potential withdrawal 
liability on employer’s credit rating and 
ability to obtain loans 
• Encourage employers to remain in the 
plan 
Because this is a clarification of current 
law, no tradeoffs were identified 
Design and manage plan to minimize or 
eliminate withdrawal liability 
Without withdrawal liability, a plan will be 
better able to attract new employers and 
expand its contribution base 
• Plan may need to lower benefit accrual 
rate and/or increase contributions to 
ensure plan is adequately funded, 
such as with a flexible benefit design 
(see next section) 
• Does not address legacy costs so this 
strategy may only help plans 
prospectively 
Protect newly joining employers by placing 
them in a separate “pool” in which they only 
accrue liability prospectively, and do not 
assume liabilities of existing employers; 
employers from the “old” pool may move to 
the new pool if they pay withdrawal liability 
• Permissible under current law 
• Tool for plan to encourage new 
employers to join the plan and healthy 
employers to continue to participate 
• Withdrawal liability payments to move 
to the new pool increases plan assets  
• Some employers may not be able to 
afford paying withdrawal liability to 
move to the new pool 
• Employers in the new pool could still 
be faced with unfunded liabilities from 
the old pool in the event of a mass 
withdrawal 
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been paid. However, increasing the amount of withdrawal liability that 
plans can collect may also discourage new employers from participating 
in a plan because it increases the potential withdrawal liability they could 
be required to pay. On the other hand, options that could reduce the 
deterrent effect on new employers—such as the proposal to omit 
contributions required by funding improvement or rehabilitation plans from 
withdrawal liability calculations—could reduce a plan’s ability to collect 
sufficient withdrawal liability. 
Numerous plan representatives, experts, and the NCCMP Commission 
recommend the adoption of a more flexible DB model to avoid a repetition 
of the current challenges facing multiemployer plans. While the specific 
plan design can vary, in general, this model allows trustees to adjust 
benefits based on key factors—such as the plan’s funded status, 
investment returns, or plan demographics—to keep the plan well-funded. 
Importantly, it reduces the risk that contributing employers would face 
contribution increases if the plan experiences poor investment returns or 
other adverse events. Investment risk is thus primarily shared by 
participants and the plan is designed to avoid incurring any withdrawal 
liability. Overall, the trustees of the plan would have greater flexibility than 
under a traditional DB plan to adjust benefits to keep the plan well-
funded. See table 8 for a comparison of two alternative flexible DB plan 
designs, although other models could also be used. In addition, the 
NCCMP Commission’s proposal would also give more flexibility for 
traditional DB plans by allowing these plans to adjust the normal 
retirement age to harmonize with Social Security’s normal retirement 
age.54 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
54 NCCMP’s proposal would allow plans this flexibility subject to limitations. For example, 
increases in a plan’s normal retirement age would not apply to current retirees or 
participants who are within 10 years of the existing normal retirement age. 
Facilitate Adoption of Flexible 
Defined Benefit Plan Design 
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Table 8: Options for a Flexible DB Plan to Address Risks Facing Multiemployer Plans 
Flexible DB option Key features 
Cheiron Variable DB model • Benefit at retirement is the greater of the: 
1) floor defined benefit (e.g., career average pay formula based on an assumed rate of 
return of 5%) or 
2) variable benefit accrued when investment returns exceed floor rate (e.g., greater 
than 5%) 
• Returns in excess of a cap (e.g., 10%) are used to establish a contingency reserve to 
mitigate effect of market downturns on the plan’s funded status 
• Plan uses a relatively conservative investment strategy in line with floor rate of return 
• At retirement, the greater of the two benefits for a participant is converted into an 
annuity, which is purchased from a private insurer or managed by the plan using a 
conservative investment strategy 
• Contingency reserve fund and conservative investment strategy designed to minimize 
risk of withdrawal liability 
NCCMP Target Benefit modela • Contributions are designed to attain a certain benefit level based on various 
assumptions, including investment rate of return 
• More conservative funding standards than current system 
• In the event of a funding shortfall, certain past and future benefits earned under the new 
model can be adjusted 
• No withdrawal liability 
• No PBGC coverage 
Source: GAO analysis based on interviews with industry experts and documentation from Cheiron and NCCMP. 
aNCCMP’s proposal highlights support for the Target Benefit model, as well as the Cheiron model, but 
does not endorse any specific model as exclusive. 
 
Notably, the Cheiron proposal would also use more conservative 
approaches to investment and funding policy because it uses a relatively 
lower assumed rate of return and a contingency reserve fund. The 
Cheiron proposal calls for a more conservative asset allocation and, in 
addition to sharing some of the investment risk with participants through 
the flexible benefit design, would also reduce the overall amount of 
investment risk through the more conservative asset allocation. In 
addition, the Cheiron model would use a contingency reserve fund that 
could provide a cushion against unfavorable investment or demographic 
experience. 
The design of a flexible DB plan offers several key benefits, which some 
stakeholders said are essential to the long-term survival of the 
multiemployer system. In particular, several stakeholders cited limiting 
employer liability as a key benefit. Representatives of several employers 
said it is imperative to limit their liability to enable them to be competitive 
against competitors. By minimizing risks to employers, a flexible DB 
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model may strengthen employers’ commitment to the plan and reduce 
incentives for them to leave. Similarly, reducing risk may also help attract 
new employers to these plans, which may improve a plan’s demographics 
and help it stay well-funded and viable in the long term. Additionally, a 
group of employer representatives said that a flexible DB plan, such as 
the one developed by Cheiron, in conjunction with the United Food and 
Commercial Workers (UFCW) International Union, provides trustees more 
tools to prudently manage the plan to keep it well-funded and able to pay 
promised benefits even when faced with adverse events, such as poor 
investment returns or demographic shifts. Moreover, some stakeholders 
said that a flexible DB plan reduces risk while also avoiding challenges 
associated with defined contribution (DC) plans. Specifically, 
representatives of a construction industry group said a flexible DB plan 
would still offer pooled and professionally managed investments, along 
with risk sharing among participants, which can mitigate some of the 
individual risks faced by participants in DC plans, such as investment risk 
and longevity risk.55 Given the potential long-term benefits of a flexible DB 
model, some experts said regulatory agencies could do more to help 
plans adopt a design with these features. For example, one expert said 
that PBGC could hold a conference on best practices in plan design. In 
addition, this expert said that PBGC could charge such plans lower 
premiums commensurate with their lower risk to encourage adoption of 
these plan design features; however, PBGC lacks the legal authority to do 
so.56 
Some plan representatives and experts also noted that a flexible DB 
model entails tradeoffs. In particular, representatives from an actuarial 
firm and from an industry group said that while this approach shows 
promise for addressing prospective challenges, it does not help resolve 
                                                                                                                    
55 We have previously reported on some of the challenges workers face in accumulating 
sufficient retirement savings in DC plans. See, for example: GAO, 401(k) Plans: Policy 
Changes Could Reduce the Long-term Effects of Leakage on Workers’ Retirement 
Savings, GAO-09-715 (Washington, D.C.: August 2009); Private Pensions: Alternative 
Approaches Could Address Retirement Risks Faced by Workers but Pose Trade-offs, 
GAO-09-642 (Washington, D.C.: July 2009); and Retirement Income: Ensuring Income 
throughout Retirement Requires Difficult Choices, GAO-11-400 (Washington, D.C.: June 
2011). 
56 For information on challenges facing PBGC’s single-employer program and its premium 
structure, see: GAO, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Redesigned Premium 
Structure Could Better Align Rates with Risk from Plan Sponsors, GAO-13-58 
(Washington, D.C.: November 2012).  
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problems for plans that already have financial shortfalls. Union and 
employer representatives said that plans may first need to address 
existing shortfalls before they could adopt a flexible DB model. Thus, new 
design options are unlikely to help large plans that are already severely 
underfunded. Further, in the flexible benefit models described in table 8, 
investment risk is primarily borne by participants. Representatives from 
an actuarial firm also said that this model may be relatively expensive 
when comparing the amount of contributions needed to attain a certain 
level of accrued benefits. For example, in order to minimize the risk of 
underfunding, a flexible DB plan may use a relatively low assumed rate of 
return—and, correspondingly, a more conservative investment strategy—
than is more commonly used by multiemployer plans. Over the long term, 
this may result in a lower level of accrued benefit. However, 
representatives of one actuarial firm said that higher assumed rates of 
return used by some multiemployer plans may be too high and could 
entail a greater risk of the plan becoming underfunded. And, as recent 
events show, participants already assume a lot of risk in the event a plan 
becomes severely underfunded. As a result, a flexible benefit model that 
reduces risk might provide a somewhat lower promised benefit, but one 
that is more secure. 
Facilitating more plan mergers or allowing plans to form alliances may 
also help address financial challenges facing multiemployer plans, 
according to some plan representatives and industry experts. In a merger, 
two or more plans are combined into a single plan, including both plan 
assets and administration. Several stakeholders said that this 
consolidation helps plans—especially smaller plans—achieve more 
favorable economies of scale to reduce costs. For example, in a merger, 
plans can reduce costs by consolidating administrative services, such as 
annual audits and legal services. In some cases, PBGC provides financial 
assistance to facilitate a merger by paying a plan that is insolvent or 
nearing insolvency a portion of the present value of PBGC’s net liability 
for that plan, which serves as an incentive for a well-funded plan to take 
on the assets and liabilities of a less well-funded plan. PBGC officials said 
that they are careful to provide financial assistance only in the case of 
mergers expected to be successful and, thus, avoid paying financial 
assistance twice to the same plan. While PBGC has helped to facilitate 
some mergers, several plan representatives and a representative from an 
actuarial firm said more plans could merge if PBGC provided additional 
financial assistance. Alternatively, other stakeholders said similar cost-
saving benefits from consolidation could be achieved by allowing plans to 
form alliances. In contrast to a merger, alliances allow plans to combine 
administrative and investment management services, but retain separate 
Encourage Mergers and 
Alliances 
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liabilities and funding accounts. Consequently, in an alliance, each plan 
would retain its own liabilities and withdrawal liability obligations would not 
be shared across plans. 
Along with cost savings from consolidating administrative services, plan 
representatives and industry experts said mergers and alliances can offer 
other important benefits. In particular, a merger or alliance would provide 
plans a larger asset pool that can also help plans reduce investment 
management fees. According to a representative from an actuarial firm, 
combined with administrative cost savings, consolidating investment 
management services can significantly reduce costs for small plans and 
may save some from insolvency. For example, some of their small plan 
clients pay between 30 and 40 percent of contributions towards 
administrative and investment management expenses while a larger plan 
would pay closer to 5 percent. However, another expert said cost savings 
for some plans may be negligible depending on the plan’s circumstances. 
For example, if a plan is already sufficiently large and efficiently 
managed, cost savings from merging with another plan may be relatively 
small. In addition, several stakeholders said that by helping plans avoid 
insolvency, PBGC may also benefit from plan mergers or alliances 
because the participants of these plans would continue to receive benefits 
from the plan rather than becoming insolvent and relying on benefit 
payments from PBGC. Consequently, the cost PBGC incurs to facilitate 
such arrangements may be more than offset by preventing the plan from 
becoming insolvent.57 
While mergers can provide cost-savings and other benefits, plans face 
barriers to implementing them. For example, representatives from one of 
the largest plans said that due to the relatively large size of their plan and 
the amount of their funding shortfall, a merger is not an option for them. 
Several stakeholders said a merger between a plan that is relatively well-
funded and a financially weaker plan poses concerns for plan trustees 
who have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of their plan’s 
participants. One employer representative said that a merger poses risks 
to the healthier plan and may not be in the best interests of those 
participants. To address potential risks to the healthier plan, some 
stakeholders said PBGC should be given greater resources to facilitate 
                                                                                                                    
57 In fiscal year 2011, PBGC provided $15.1 million to help plan sponsors close out or 
merge five plans. 
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more mergers. In addition, some employer representatives said plans that 
undertake mergers could be afforded legal protection under a safe harbor 
to further alleviate concerns over fiduciary responsibility. While alliances 
may avoid some of these concerns—they would not require plans to 
harmonize their funding status as each plan retains its own liabilities—
such arrangements are not currently permitted and would therefore 
require a change in law according to NCCMP. 
 
Despite unfavorable economic conditions, most multiemployer plans are 
currently in adequate financial condition and may remain so for many 
years. However, a number of plans, including some very large plans, are 
facing very severe financial difficulties. Many of these plans reported that 
no realistic combination of contribution increases or allowable benefit 
reductions—options available under current law to address their financial 
condition—will enable them to emerge from critical status. As a result, 
without Congressional action, the plans face the likelihood of eventual 
insolvency. While the multiemployer system was designed to limit 
PBGC’s exposure by having employers serve as principal guarantors, 
PBGC remains the guarantor of last resort. However, given their current 
financial challenges, neither the troubled multiemployer plans nor PBGC 
currently have the flexibility or financial resources to fully mitigate the 
effects of anticipated insolvencies. Should a critical mass of plan 
insolvencies drain the PBGC multiemployer insurance fund, PBGC will 
not be able to pay either current or future retirees more than a very small 
fraction of the benefit they were promised. Consequently, a substantial, 
and in some cases catastrophic, loss of income in old age looms as a real 
possibility for the hundreds of thousands of workers and retirees 
depending on these plans. 
Congressional action is needed to avoid this scenario, and stakeholders 
suggested a number of key policy options. For example, various 
stakeholders suggested that, as a last resort to avert insolvency, 
Congress could enact legislation permitting plans—subject to certain 
limitations, protections, and oversight—to reduce accrued benefits of both 
working participants and retirees. In addition, some stakeholders 
suggested that Congress could give PBGC the authority and resources to 
assist the most severely underfunded plans. Stakeholders acknowledged 
that each of these options poses tradeoffs. Providing PBGC with 
additional resources, as well as other more direct financial assistance to 
plans, would create yet another demand on an already strained federal 
budget. Similarly, reducing accrued benefits for active workers, and 
especially for those already in retirement, could result in significant 
Conclusions 
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reductions in income for a group that may have limited income 
alternatives and may be too infirm to return to the labor force. Such an 
option would also significantly compromise one of the key founding 
principles of ERISA—that accrued benefits cannot be reduced—
essentially rupturing a promise to workers and retirees who have labored 
for many years, often in dangerous occupations, and in some of the 
nation’s most vital industries. 
The scope and severity of the challenges outlined by stakeholders 
suggest that a broad, comprehensive response is needed and Congress 
faces difficult choices in responding to these challenges. However, as the 
recent tri-agency federal report on multiemployer plans noted, unless 
timely action is taken to provide additional tools for the multiemployer plan 
trustees to stabilize the financial conditions of their plans, more costly and 
intrusive measures may later be necessary. Nevertheless, this situation 
can also be viewed as an opportunity both to protect the benefits of 
hundreds of thousands of older Americans and stabilize a pension system 
that has worked fairly well for decades. Without a comprehensive 
approach, efforts to improve the long-term financial condition of the 
multiemployer system may not be effective. 
 
Given the serious challenges facing PBGC’s multiemployer insurance 
fund and critically underfunded multiemployer plans, and to prevent the 
significant adverse effects of PBGC insolvency on workers and retirees, 
Congress should consider comprehensive and balanced structural 
reforms to reinforce and stabilize the multiemployer system. In doing so, 
Congress should consider the relative burdens, as identified by key 
stakeholders, that each reform option would impose on the competing 
interests of employers, plans, workers and retirees, PBGC, and 
taxpayers. 
 
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Labor, the 
Department of the Treasury, and the PBGC for review and comment. We 
received formal written comments from the PBGC, which generally 
agreed with our findings and analysis. During the review period, PBGC 
officials raised the potential role that increased multiemployer insurance 
program premiums could play in strengthening the program, and hence in 
helping to ensure that participants in insolvent plans received some 
financial protection in the long term. In addition, the issue of PBGC 
premiums was raised repeatedly during a March 5, 2013 hearing held by 
the House Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions, 
Matters for 
Congressional 
Consideration 
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Committee on Education and the Workforce. In light of the level of interest 
on this issue, we included a brief discussion of the matter of premiums in 
the final version of our report. PBGC, Labor, and Treasury also provided 
technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate. PBGC’s 
formal comments are reproduced in appendix II. 
 
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its 
issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to relevant 
congressional committees, PBGC, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary 
of the Treasury, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be 
made available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 
If you have any questions about this report, please contact Charles 
Jeszeck at (202) 512-7215 or jeszeckc@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are found in 
appendix III. 
Sincerely yours, 
 
Charles A. Jeszeck 
Director 
Education, Workforce, and Income Security 
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Our objectives were to answer the following research questions: 
1) What actions have multiemployer plans in the weakest financial 
condition taken in recent years to improve their long-term financial 
position? 
2) To what extent have plans relied on PBGC assistance since 2009, and 
what is known about the prospective financial condition of the 
multiemployer plan insurance program? 
3) What options are available to address PBGC’s impending funding 
crisis and enhance the program’s future financial stability? 
We sought to answer the first question in two primary steps. First, we 
obtained data on the results of a survey of critical status plans performed 
by The Segal Company, a large actuarial firm that has a client base 
consisting of about 25 percent of all multiemployer plans, representing 
about 30 percent of all multiemployer plan participants. As figure 13 
below illustrates, the industry distribution of Segal’s client base 
substantially parallels that of the broader multiemployer universe. 
Included as an addendum to Segal’s annual survey of plan funded status, 
the survey instrument requested information about the nature and size of 
contribution increases and benefit reductions, whether plans expected to 
emerge from the critical zone within statutory time frames, and the 
estimated number of years until emergence from the critical zone or, for 
plans not expecting to emerge, the number of years to plan insolvency. 
The information pertaining to each of the 107 critical plans in the survey 
was completed by Segal’s professional actuaries responsible for those 
clients. The survey was initiated in December 2010, and responses were 
received through February 2011. Through a review of the methodology 
underlying the survey, and discussions with a Segal representative 
knowledgeable about the survey, we determined that the results were 
reliable and useful for our research. Second, we supplemented this data 
with in-depth interviews with representatives of 13 multiemployer plans—
8 were in critical status, 2 in endangered or seriously endangered status, 
and 3 in neither critical nor endangered status. We selected the plans to 
ensure that we included a range of plan sizes, industries, geographical 
areas, and funding status. Plans selected ranged in size from about 2,000 
participants to more than 531,000 participants and represented a variety 
of industries including those featuring some of the largest concentrations 
of multiemployer plans—construction, manufacturing, and transportation. 
Before speaking with plan officials, we reviewed available data, including 
rehabilitation or funding improvement plans, and other relevant 
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documents. Our in-depth discussions with plan representatives covered 
various issues, including plans’ use of and views regarding funding relief, 
the nature and size of the contribution increases and benefit reductions, 
and the probable impact of contribution increases and benefit reductions 
on employers and plan participants. 
Figure 13: Comparison of the Segal Client Base and Multiemployer Universe, by 
Major Industry 
 
 
To answer the second question, we interviewed officials and analyzed 
data from PBGC, including recent PBGC annual reports and data books. 
We also developed several data requests for PBGC that were tailored to 
this objective, and reviewed information provided by PBGC in response. 
For example, we obtained data on the amount of PBGC’s annual 
assistance to plans due to plan insolvencies, plan partitions, and 
assistance granted for other reasons, such as plan mergers or closures. 
We also obtained and analyzed updated data regarding PBGC’s overall 
financial position and the size of its long-term deficits. Specifically, we 
obtained data on the liabilities attributable to plans on PBGC’s list of plans 
that are insolvent or considered likely to become insolvent in the next 10 
years, as well as those thought likely to become insolvent in the next 10 
to 20 years. To better understand the consequences of plan insolvency 
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on retirees, we interviewed relevant PBGC officials and requested data 
regarding the impact of insolvency on retirees of various wage levels and 
tenures. Finally, we discussed the impact of potential PBGC insolvency in 
our discussions with multiemployer plan officials. 
To answer the third objective, we distinguished between options that 
would address the more immediate funding crisis facing plans headed 
toward insolvency and options that may enhance the long-run stability of 
the multiemployer system for plans that may not be headed for 
insolvency, but, nevertheless, face financial challenges. We assessed the 
tradeoffs of various options for current workers, retirees, and employers, 
as well as the federal government. To identify and assess available 
options, we interviewed a wide range of pension experts—including 
academics, actuaries, attorneys, plan trustees and administrators, 
employers and trade associations, unions, advocacy organizations, 
government officials, and other relevant stakeholders. We also reviewed 
relevant research and documentation, including a proposal by the 
National Coordinating Committee for Multiemployer Plans (NCCMP) and 
research by other industry experts. 
As appropriate for each of our objectives, we reviewed existing literature 
and relevant federal laws and regulations. 
We conducted this performance audit from March 2012 through March 
2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 
obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
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